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The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: 
A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines 
Diana Saso* 
Olimpial 
Olimpia was raped, beaten and continuously abused for months by a 
sergeant in the Armed Forces of the Salvadoran military. He raped her at 
gunpoint, held grenades to her head, and pummeled her face, causing a 
blood clot to form in one eye. The sergeant threatened that if Olimpia ever 
told on him he would declare she was a subversive and subject her to hav-
ing her tongue cut off, her nails removed one by one, her eyes pulled out, 
and then she would be killed. 
Sofia2 
While visiting her uncle who was involved in the controversial agrar-
ian land reform movement, Sofia, along with her uncle, male cousin and 
three female cousins, was attacked by armed assailants. They were 
dragged to the edge of the farm's waste pit where their hands and feet were 
bound and the women were gagged. Forcing the women to watch, the as-
sailants hacked the flesh from the men's bodies with machetes and then 
shot the men to death. While a woman who accompanied the attackers 
shouted political slogans in the background, the attackers subsequently 
raped the women, and then cut them loose, threatening to kill them unless 
they fled immediately. Sofia suffered a nervous breakdown and had to re-
main in the hospital for fifteen days. While visiting her parents, Sofia's 
mother introduced her to two of her cousins who recently had fled from the 
guerrillas and moved into the neighborhood. Sofia immediately recog-
• Member of the Class of 1997; 1996-97 Managing Editor of the Hastings Women's 
Law Journal. 
1. The facts described are based on Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 
1987). The Ninth Circuit granted Olimpia's request for asylum after she had received de-
nials from the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 
2. The facts described are based on Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 
1987). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of her asylum application by the Immigration 
Judge and the BIA. 
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nized one of them as one of her attackers. On several occasions, he sought 
her out and threatened to kill her and her family if she revealed his iden-
tity. 
"M ary" 3 
Despite being pressured for years by her mother, Mary adamantly re-
fused to undergo female genital mutilation, which is a common traditional 
practice in Sierra Leone. At the age of twenty-three, Mary was no longer 
given a choice. While asleep in her parents' home, Mary was abducted, 
blindfolded, and her hands and legs were bound to prevent her escape. 
Against her will, she was taken to a place in the jungle where female geni-
tal mutilation is performed as part of an initiation ritual. Using an un-
sterilized razor, a woman elder performed the mutilation late at night 
without giving Mary any anesthesia or medication. Mary's clothes were 
removed but she remained bound and was held down while the elder cut 
away her clitoris and her labia minora. Other women sang to disguise her 
screams. Following her mutilation, Mary was required to take an oath of 
secrecy and was threatened with death if she were to reveal information 
about the ceremony and her mutilation. 4 
"Debra"s 
At the age of thirteen, Debra was abducted, gagged, and bound in Si-
erra Leone. While her female relatives held her down, her clitoris was cut 
off with a knife. Women partaking in the ritual beat drums during the 
mutilation so no one could hear the screaming. Under the threat of death, 
Debra was forced to swear that she would never reveal the details of what 
had been done to her. Debra claims that she would rather speak out and 
face the threat of death by witchcraft than remain silent and allow her 
daughters to be subjected to the same fate. 6 
3. The facts described are based on a case decided by an Immigration Judge in Arling-
ton, VA, MatterofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9,1995), reported in 
IJ Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, 72 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1188 (1995). Mary is not the applicant's actual name. 
4. Immigration Judge Paul A. Nejelski granted her asylum claim, which was also based 
on spousal abuse and her political activism. The INS appealed the decision, but later 
withdrew its appeal. See id. 
5. The facts described are based on a case decided by an Immigration Judge in Balti-
more, MD. The case is reported in More on IJ Decision Granting Asylum Based on 
Genital Mutilation, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1265 (1995) and Pamela Constable, INS 
Debates Female Mutilation as Basis for Asylum, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1995, at Dl. De-
bra is not the applicant's actual name. 
6. Immigration Judge John F. Gossart, Jr. denied her asylum application, asserting that 
female genital mutilation was an "important ritual" that "binds the tribe" in many Mrican 
countries. The applicant's concerns about retribution against her or the forced mutilation 
of her daughters did not constitute fear of persecution for asylum purposes. According to 
Immigration Judge Gossart, a woman "cannot change the fact that she's a female, but she 
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INTRODUCTION 
The cases discussed above exemplify the evolving and often erratic na-
ture of the law surrounding gender-based asylum claims. For years, asylum 
advocates have exposed the plight of refugee women by highlighting the in-
consistencies in the case law and the uncertainty inherent in presenting asy-
lum claims based on gender-related persecution. Asylum advocates, schol-
ars, and international and domestic organizations have emphasized the need 
to ameliorate the persecution of refugee women by increasing awareness and 
devising more efficient procedures for the adjudication of gender-based 
asylum claims. On May 26, 1995, the Immigration and Nationality Service 
(INS) published an acknowledgment of this need.7 
In response to the recent and still developing U.S. case law and other 
compelling factors, the INS Office of International Mfairs issued a memo-
randum which was written to "provide the INS Asylum Officer Corps with 
guidance and background on adjudicating cases of women having asylum 
claims based wholly or in part on their gender.,,8 These guidelines were in-
tended to ameliorate the multiple problems that women refugees face when 
presenting claims of gender-based persecution. By educating Asylum Offi-
cers as to the procedural considerations unique to gender-based asylum 
claims, as well as the legal framework in which these claims should be ana-
lyzed, the INS Guidelines represent a significant step toward providing fair 
adjudications of claims presented by women fleeing persecution. However, 
despite this progress, the Guidelines are inherently deficient, providing only 
limited analyses of issues in many areas and wholly failing to discuss others. 
mtimately, the case law in the United States must evolve to create a legal 
environment in which women can prevail on valid gender-based asylum 
claims. 
This Comment takes a critical, in-depth look at the INS Guidelines, dis-
cussing their strengths, weaknesses, and limitations which affect the adjudi-
cation of asylum claims based on gender related persecution. Part I provides 
a brief overview of asylum law in the United States. Part IT looks at the 
multiple influences which engendered the issuance of the INS Guidelines, 
discussing both international and national initiatives. Part m explores the 
procedural considerations specific to gender-based asylum claims which 
should be employed by Asylum Officers in their adjudications. Part IV 
analyzes the legal framework the INS Guidelines provide for the evaluation 
of gender-based asylum claims. Part V discusses gender-based asylum case 
law since the issuance of the INS Guidelines. Finally, this Comment con-
can change her mind with regards to her position" toward female genital mutilation, and 
choose to "acquiesce to the tribal position." See id. 
7. Phyllis Coven, INS Office of International Affairs, Considerations for Asylum Offi-
cers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women, May 26, 1995 [hereinafter INS Guide-
lines or Guidelines]. 
8. Id. at 1. 
266 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
eludes that although the issuance of the INS Guidelines represents a signifi-
cant step towards creating a more receptive legal environment for women 
refugees, ultimately the case law and statutory framework must develop to a 
level which compels uniform treatment of gender-based asylum applicants, 
and the INS must adhere to the guidelines it promulgated. 
I. OVERVIEW OF U.S. ASYLUM LA W9 
In the pre-World War II era, the immigration laws of the United States 
did not recognize a right to asylum.lO Following World War II, up until 
1980, the United States responded to refugee problems by enacting legisla-
tion to address refugee crises as they arose. 11 In 1968, the United States ac-
ceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. 12 Despite this accession, the U.S. did not incorporate the provisions of 
the 1967 Protocol into U.S. immigration law until the Refugee Act of 
1980.13 With this enactment, Congress intended to bring U.S. law into 
compliance with the 1967 Protocol, and to improve the existing asylum pro-
cedures. 14 Regulations setting forth a formal asylum application process 
were not codified until 1990.15 These regulations were recently reformed 
and the new regulations were published in December 1994.16 
Under the current asylum application process, an immigrant can apply 
9. This comment provides only a brief overview of asylum law in the United States. 
For a detailed analysis of U.S. asylum law, see generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAw OF 
AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE PRAcrICE AND CASE LAW (2d 
ed. 1991). For a discussion of recent changes to U.S. asylum law, see AUSTIN T. 
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., 1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK 5-1-5-20 (1996). 
10. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw 147 (2d ed. 1992). 
11. See id. at 147-48. 
12. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The 1967 
Protocol incorporated Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. See also Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Per-
secution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 625, 634 n.40 
(1993). By acceding to the 1967 Protocol, signatory nations are bound by the Articles of 
the 1951 Convention. 
13. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101 
(1988». The Refugee Act of 1980 directed the Attorney General, through the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, to "establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the 
United States or at a land border or port of entry .. , to apply for asylum .... " Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 208(a), 8 U.S.c. § 1158 (1994). 
14. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States did not have a uniform proce-
dure for granting asylum in the U.S. See Jeanne A. Butterfield, The New Asylum Regula-
tions: A Practitioner's Guide, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Jan. 1995, at 1. 
15. The asylum application process was first manifested in the form of interim regula-
tions; the INS codified the asylum application process in final asylum regulations which 
were published in 1990. The final regulations are codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1996). See 
Butterfield, supra note 14, at 1 n.4. 
16. [d. at 2. 
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for asylum in one of two ways: affrrmatively or defensively.17 Afftrmative 
claims are made when aliens ftle directly with the INS .18 Approximately 
ninety percent of asylum claims are made affrrmatively.19 Immigrants may 
also raise a claim of asylum defensively as a form of relief in exclusion or 
deportation proceedings before an Immigration Judge.20 Under the Refugee 
Act, which is codifted within the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),21 
asylum is available to aliens who are in the United States, or at a U.S. land 
border or port of entry when they request refuge. The Attorney General has 
the discretion to grant asylum to any person who meets the statutory defmi-
tion of "refugee.,,22 . 
The INA's defmition adopted the language of the 1951 United Nations 
Convention which defmes a refugee as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any 
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is un-
able or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.23 
Thus, to prevail on an asylum claim, the applicant must establish that 
she has been persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear of persecution 
in the future,24 that the feared persecution will be by the government or by 





21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994). 
The INA was recently amended by the megal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. See 
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-1-5-20. 
22. The definition is set forth at INA § 101 (a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (1994). 
23. Id. According to at least one commentator, "[t]he only substantive difference be-
tween the refugee definition contained in the Convention and that adopted by the United 
States through the Refugee Act was the inclusion in the Refugee Act of past persecution as 
a basis for determination of refugee status." Kelly, supra note 12, at 634 n.42. 
24. In Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989), the BIA held that an applicant can 
establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution even when he or she does not 
have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The regulations provide that an applicant's 
proof of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 108. 13(b )(1) (1996). For a recent analysis of the past perse-
cution standard, see In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996). See also Deborah Anker et aI., 
The BIA's New Asylum Jurisprudence and Its Relevance for Women's Claims, 73 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 1173, 1177-78 (1996) (discussing analysis of past persecution stan-
dard in In re H- and its relevance to gender-based asylum claims). 
25. See, e.g., Matter of McMullen, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (claiming Irish gov-
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cution is on account of one of the five enumerated grounds,26 and that her 
asylum application should be granted in the exercise of discretion.27 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE GUIDELINES AND 
INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE 
As the asylum application process continued to evolve, developments in 
both the international and North American spheres contributed to the formu-
lation and issuance of the INS Guidelines. Common to both spheres was the 
growing recognition that women's rights are human rights and its corollary, 
violations of women's rights are violations of human rights. 28 Existing in-
ternational human rights instruments and the interpretation of these instru-
ments by international organizations provide an appropriate and instructive 
framework in which gender-based claims can be evaluated. 29 
A. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
For the past two decades, the United Nations has promoted the principle 
that women's rights are human rights and that women's rights are universal. 
In 1979, the United Nations' General Assembly adopted the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
ernment was unable to prevent persecution of the applicant by the Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army). Gender-based asylum applicants often face persecution at the hands of 
non-governmental persons. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(applicant was repeatedly beaten and raped by guerrillas in El Salvador); Campos-
Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (applicant was raped and forced to watch 
the murder of her relatives by armed assailants in EI Salvador); Matter of A- and Z-, 
A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va. Dec. 20, 1994), reported in /J Grants Asy-
lum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS Guidelines Imminent, 72 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 521 (1995) (applicant exposed to ongoing physical and verbal abuse by her hus-
band); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), reported in /J 
Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, supra 
note 3, at 1188 (applicant subjected to female genital mutilation by tribal women elders). 
26. In cases based on political opinion, the persecution may be based on an opinion im-
puted to the applicant by the persecutor in addition to persecution on account of her own 
political opinion. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
applicant was eligible for political asylum based on her own political opinion and on the 
political opinion imputed to her by her persecutor). The Supreme Court's decision in INS 
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), placed the viability of the imputed political opin-
ion basis in question. But see Kelly, supra note 12, at 636 n.47 (citing GROVER J. REES ill, 
GENERAL COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURAliZATION SERVICE, LEGAL OPINION: 
CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMpUTED POLITICAL OPINION (JAN. 19, 1993» 
(stating that "persecution inflicted because the persecutor erroneously imputes to the vic-
tim one of the protected characteristics set forth in Section 101(a)(42) can constitute perse-
cution 'on account of that characteristic for the purpose of asylum or refugee analysis"). 
27. See Butterfield, supra note 14, at 3; Kelly, supra note 12, at 635-36. 
28. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 1-2 ("Spurred by the United Nations and a handful 
of commentators, notably in Canada and the United States, understanding of gender-
related violence in general is increasing."). 
29. "These instruments need not be ratified by the United States to provide guidance as 
a source of human rights norms." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 n.2 (citing INS BASIC 
LAwMANUAL 11-12 (2d. ed ». 
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(CEDA W).30 CEDA W, the most comprehensive international human rights 
instrument for women, seeks to eliminate the obstacles which prevent the 
equal participation of women in political, social, economic, and cultural 
life. 31 Signatory States are prohibited from engaging in discriminatory acts 
and are required to take affrrmative steps to eradicate discriminatory treat-
ment towards women. 32 
The comprehensive nature of CEDA W set the stage for the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee's 
adoption of Conclusion No. 3933 in 1985, the ftrst UNHCR statement of its 
kind.34 This "Conclusion on Refugee Women" noted that refugee women 
and girls constitute the majority of the world refugee population with many 
being exposed to special problems due to their gender. The 1985 Conclu-
sion encouraged countries to recognize women asylum-seekers who face 
harsh and inhuman treatment due to their transgression of social mores as a 
"particular social group" within the meaning of Article lA(2) of the 1951 
Convention. 35 Because the UNHCR' s interpretations of the 1951 Conven-
tion are widely respected and often followed, the 1985 Conclusion initiated 
greater recognition of gender-related persecution claims. 36 
The 1985 Conclusion was followed by the UNHCR's issuance of its 
"Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,,37 in 1991. Although the 
UNHCR Guidelines primarily focus on issues pertaining to women in refu-
gee camps, they also highlight the need to address gender-based persecu-
tion.38 The UNHCR Guidelines mark a turning point in the international 
awareness of the plight of women fleeing persecution on account of their 
gender. 39 In particular, they represent international recognition that immi-
gration laws need to accept gender-based persecution as a valid basis for ac-
quiring asylum or refugee status.40 Thus, the UNHCR Guidelines encour-
age states to adopt procedures which make the refugee adjudication process 
30. COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
at 17, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHAl3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.IV.3 (1988). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 18. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2. 
33. Refugee Women and International Protection Report, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 
36th Sess., 'I 115(4)(k), U.N. Doc. AlAG.96/673 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Conclusion]. 
34. Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution Claims, IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1994, at 3. 
35. The 1985 Conclusion was preceded by a resolution adopted by the European Par-
liament which called upon member states to accord refugee status within the particular 
social group category of the refugee definition to women who suffer cruel and inhuman 
treatment because they have violated the moral or ethical rules of their society. See Kelly, 
supra note 12, at 659 nn.163, 165; Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3 n.22. 
36. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3. 
37. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDEUNES ON THE PRo-
TECflON OF REFUGEE WOMEN (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES]. 
38. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3. 
39. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3. 
40. Id. 
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more accessible to women.41 
In response to the UNHCR Guidelines, the United Nations Conference 
on Human Rights emphasized the need to incorporate the rights of women as 
part of universal human rights,42 and called upon the General Assembly to 
adopt the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 
June 1993. 43 The 1993 Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly on 
December 20, 1993, recognized violence against women as both a per se 
violation of human rights and as an impediment to the enjoyment by women 
of other human rights.44 Additionally, in October 1993, the UNHCR Ex-
ecutive Committee adopted Conclusion No. 73 on Refugee Protection and 
Sexual Violence (1993 Conclusion), which recognized that refugee women 
who are victims of sexual violence should be treated with particular sensi-
tivity.45 Thus, under the 1993 Conclusion, nations should establish training 
programs designed to sensitize those involved in the refugee status determi-
nation process to issues of gender and culture. 
B. NORTHAMERICANDEVELOPMENTS 
While United Nations initiatives between 1979 and 1993 brought atten-
tion to gender-based persecution in the international sphere, two recent de-
velopments in Canada and the United States increased awareness in the 
North American sphere about the plight of refugee women, presenting effec-
tive frameworks in which gender-based asylum claims can be determined. In 
March 1993, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) issued a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for adjudicating the asylum claims of refu-
gee women fleeing persecution.46 The Canadian Guidelines were the fust 
national guidelines to formally recognize that women fleeing gender-related 
persecution can be refugees under the 1951 Convention.47 Even more ex-
41. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3. 
42. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Adoption of the Final Documents and Re-
port of the Conference: Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final Outcome of 
the World Conference of Human Rights, U.N. HCR, at 8-9, , 9, U.N. Doc. 
A\Conf.157\DC\l\Add.l (1993)). 
43. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Adoption of the Final Documents and Re-
port of the Conference: Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final Outcome of 
the World Conference of Human Rights, U.N. HCR, at 23, , 3, U.N. Doc. 
A\Conf.l57\DC\l\Add.l (1993)). 
44. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. 
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. Al48/49 (1993). Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR, at 18-20, U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF.157/23 (1993). 
45. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, 
U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. AlAC.96/821 (1993). 
46. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDEUNES IsSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
PuRSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS 
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993) [hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES]. 
47. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3. 
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. pansive than the UNHCR Guidelines,48 the Canadian Guidelines remain a 
model for gender-based asylum adjudications more than 3 years after their 
release.49 
In April 1994, asylum advocates 50 in the United States presented pro-
posed Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims51 to the INS. The Proposed 
Guidelines responded to the increasing number of women filing gender-
based asylum applications, and the expressed concerns of observers that the 
asylum adjudication system was not as open to women as it should be. 52 By 
highlighting these concerns to the INS, these advocates were instrumental in 
the development of the INS Guidelines. 53 
In April 1994, the INS convened a meeting to discuss the Proposed 
Guidelines and issues relating to women asylum seekers.54 One year and 
one month later, the INS Guidelines were issued as a "natural and multi-
faceted outgrowth" of these multiple influences and the recent and still de-
veloping case law in the United States. Although the INS Guidelines reflect 
many of the recommendations in the Proposed Guidelines, they are not 
nearly as permissive in their approach to adjudicating gender-based asylum 
claims nor as liberal in their analysis of the case law.55 
The INS Guidelines are intended to improve the asylum adjudication 
process in several ways. First, by addressing issues specific to gender-
related asylum claims, the INS Guidelines permit the United States to keep 
pace with gender-related human rights concerns. Second, the INS Guide-
lines provide a useful tool which Asylum Officers can employ to ensure uni-
formity and consistency in procedures and decisions relating to gender-based 
asylum adjudications. Finally, the Guidelines seek to improve the ability of 
Asylum Officers to deal more sensitively with procedural and substantive 
aspects of gender-related claims, irrespective of the applicant's country of 
origin. 
48. In contrast to the UNHCR Guidelines which primarily focus on issues pertaining to 
women in refugee camps, the Canadian Guidelines provide "a systematic method for the 
evaluation of gender-based persecution claims based on any of the applicable five grounds: 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion." 
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 4. 
49. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3. 
50. Nancy Kelly, Women Refugees Project of Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services 
and Clinical Instructor at the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Program, drafted the 
guidelines with the assistance of Deborah Anker, Women Refugees Project and Lecturer 
on Law and Coordinator at the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Program, and Michele 
Beasley, Member of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children and As-
sociate at Chadbourne & Parke. 
51. Nancy Kelly, et aI., Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 813 (1994) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines]. 
52. Id. at 813. 
53. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. 
54. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 4 n.36; INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. 
55. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. 
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III. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GENDER-BASED 
ASYLUM CLAIMS 
After discussing the background to the INS Guidelines, the memoran-
dum proceeds to delineate "Procedural Considerations for U.S. Asylum Of-
ficers." The purpose of this section is to educate the Asylum Officer Corps 
(AOC) about issues which are particularly relevant to gender-based asylum 
applications. This section of the INS Guidelines touches on many important 
factors of which the AOC should be aware. However, the Guidelines are 
notably sparse in their discussion of some factors and entirely fail to mention 
others. 
The INS Guidelines acknowledge two types of persecution women may 
face: 1) gender-specific persecution;56 and 2) gender-related persecution. 57 
Mistreatment that is primarily directed at the female population constitutes 
gender-specific persecution. The INS Guidelines specify rape, sexual abuse, 
domestic violence, infanticide, and genital mutilation as forms of persecution 
which are particular to women. 58 
In contrast, gender-related persecution is often associated with women 
from countries that maintain laws and customs which discriminate on the 
basis of gender. When women breach these laws, they may be subjected to 
harsh punishments and abuse that are not meted out to the general popUla-
tion. The persons who "enforce" these laws can be government authorities, 
or private individuals who the government is unwilling or unable to con-
trol. 59 Due to these discriminatory laws and norms, women are severely hin-
dered from exercising their social, political, civil, and economic rights. 
The INS Guidelines attempt to alert the AOC to scenarios of gender-
related persecution that women may face. For example, the Guidelines note 
that women may face harm as a result of "marrying outside of an arranged 
marriage, wearing lipstick, or failing to comply with other cultural or relig-
ious norms.,,60 However, although this list is illustrative rather than exhaus-
tive, the INS failed to provide additional examples to adequately educate the 
56. Gender-specific persecution includes acts that are specific to women such as rape, 
infanticide, genital mutilation, bride burning, forced sterilization, and domestic violence. 
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 5. 
57. Gender-related persecution encompasses situations where harm is imposed or 
threatened because of gender. This category includes cultural, social and religious norms 
which restrict the activities and choices of women (such as requiring women to dress in a 
particular way) and situations which subject women to extreme discrimination (such as 
being denied access to higher education). See id. 
58. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. The INS Guidelines also recognize that women 
who have been sexually abused or raped may face stigmatism and ostracism from their so-
cieties and families. Because they may be viewed as shaming or dishonoring themselves, 
their families and communities, these women may be vulnerable to discrimination, abuse 
or further violence. Id. at 5. 
59. See supra note 25. 
60. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. 
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Asylum Officers. Specifically, the INS could have at least mentioned re-
fusal to wear the "chador" or veil which can subject women to considerable 
abuse in Iran as noted in four gender-based asylum cases.61 
Despite this oversight, the INS Guidelines do acknowledge that women 
may present asylum claims based on gender-specific or gender-related per-
secution that can be analyzed and approved under one or more of the five 
enumerated grounds for asylum.62 For example, an applicant who was 
raped may have suffered persecution on account of her political opinion and 
her membership in a particular social groUp.63 However, although the INS 
Guidelines explain that gender-specific or gender-related persecution may 
fall under more than one of the five categories, they do not specify which of 
these categories or why. This failure to provide enough guidance is preva-
lent throughout the INS Guidelines, illustrating its deficiencies and empha-
sizing the limited effect it can have on the adjudication of women's asylum 
claims. 
In addition to identifying types of persecution women particularly may 
face, the IN.S Guidelines also provide the AOe with guidance on how to ef-
fectively and sensitively interview women fleeing persecution. The Guide-
lines acknowledge that women may be reluctant to reveal "the very delicate 
and personal issues arising from sexual abuse.,,64 The INS states that by 
reading the asylum application before the interview, the Asylum Officer may 
learn that the applicant is a victim of sexual abuse.65 In such a situation, the 
INS Guidelines intimate66 that in response to this "warning," Asylum Of-
61. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 
1994); Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 
1996); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1994). See also CANADIANGUIDEUNEs, su-
pra note 46, at 4 (discussing oppression of women in the context of religious laws); Pro-
posed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818 (stating that women who may suffer persecution 
for choosing not to follow precepts of state religion may establish an asylum claim based 
on religious persecution). 
62. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. The five enumerated grounds are race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion. 
63. The applicant's persecutor may rape her because of her own political opinion or be-
cause of her membership in a particular social group of women who hold that same politi-
cal opinion. 
64. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5. 
65. Id. 
66. The organization of the discussion of this issue in the INS Guidelines makes it un-
clear whether this is a valid conclusion. The INS first explains that Asylum Offices may 
allow female Officers to interview gender-based asylum claims, but only if available. In 
the next paragraph the INS states that a screening of the asylum application can often 
identify cases involving sexual abuse. The Guidelines then go on to say that if the abuse is 
not revealed until the interview, male and female Officers should take the "utmost care to 
assure that the interview continues in an atmosphere that allows for the discussion of past 
experiences." Thus, the INS appears to be instructing that if a screening of the asylum 
application indicates that the applicant is a victim of sexual abuse, and a female Officer is 
available, then she should conduct the interview of the applicant. See INS Guidelines, su-
pra note 7, at 5. 
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fices should have women Officers interview gender-based asylum applicants, 
but only to the extent that personnel resources will permit. However, the 
interview should not be canceled because a female Officer is not available; 
all Asylum Officers will be expected to conduct interviews of women refu-
gees.67 If the fact that the applicant has suffered sexual abuse is not re-
vealed until the interview, Asylum Officers must exercise their "utmost 
care" to maintain an environment which is conducive to a full disclosure of 
the applicant's past experiences.68 
The INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum Officers to be conscious of the 
effect that the presence of family members and the use of male interpreters 
may have on the interview process.69 In some countries, family members 
may alienate the victims of sexual violence, viewing such violence as the 
woman's fault for failing to preserve her virginity or marital dignity. 70 
Thus, women applicants should be afforded the opportunity to relate their 
story outside the presence of family, especially male family members and 
children.71 The applicant's testimony may be less traumatic if she can com-
municate freely without fearing the reaction of family members who may not 
be aware of the abuse she has suffered.72 For these reasons, the INS Guide-
lines suggest that family members or friends should not be employed as in-
terpreters because they may hinder the full disclosure of persecution the 
applicant has experienced.73 
The INS Guidelines also note that the applicant's testimony may be di-
luted or desensitized through the filter of a male interpreter especially re-
garding such issues as sexual abuse.74 However, if a gender-based asylum 
applicant arrives with a male interpreter, the interviews "should not gener-
ally be canceled and rescheduled.,,75 The UNHCR and Proposed Guidelines 
recommend that women interpreters be employed to determine refugee 
status.76 However, the applicant is required to provide her own interpreter if 
needed.77 This requirement can place a considerable burden on an applicant 
who may have fled her native country with no contacts in the United States 
and no knowledge of United States immigration law.78 
67. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 5-6. 
71. Id. at 5. Interviewing women applicants outside the presence of their families cre-
ates an atmosphere which allows for a more open discussion of past experiences. See id. 
72. See id. at 5-6. 
73. See id. at 5. 
74. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5. 
75. Id. 
76. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. 
77. This is one of the requirements which was added by the Dec. 1994 asylum regula-
tions which was not found in the previous regulations. Butterfield, supra note 14, at 8. 
78. The INS Guidelines state that they are "hopeful that NGOs [Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations] will convey our openness to female interpreters," possibly implying that 
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According to the INS Guidelines, all asylum interviews should be non-
adversarial, creating an atmosphere conducive to a comprehensive discus-
sion of past experiences.?9 Thus, Asylum Officers should attempt to develop 
a rapport with the applicant creating an environment in which the applicant 
feels comfortable recounting occurrences in the past and enabling the Asy-
lum Officer to elicit possible claims.80 Acquiring the trust of the applicant, 
however, may prove difficult for the Asylum Officer because s/he is a gov-
ernment official in a position of authority. 81 The applicant may be fleeing 
persecution inflicted by government officials or from a country in which she 
has reason to distrust authority figures. 82 Thus, the Guidelines warn that 
Asylum Officers should be aware that the applicant's initial timidity is not 
necessarily indicative of a lack of credibility, but may be a result of her past 
experiences.83 
Despite the efforts of the INS to provide guidance to the AOe on inter-
viewing women fleeing gender-based persecution, the Guidelines fail to 
mention an additional consideration which directly addresses credibility 
fmdings in gender-based asylum claims. Because many asylum claims are 
often denied due to an alleged lack of credibility, this oversight is signifi-
cant. 84 Also absent from the Guidelines is the acknowledgment that in many 
countries, men do not inform their spouses or female relatives of their politi-
cal, military, or social affairs.85 Women, therefore, often do not possess 
specific information about the activities of male relatives.86 Thus, Asylum 
Officers should not attribute deficiencies in the applicant's knowledge to a 
lack of credibility unless the Officer can cite other evidence which substan-
tiates a negative credibility finding.8? 
The INS Guidelines do acknowledge that women applicants will often 
NGOs may be a source of female interpreters and that interpreters can be sure that the INS 
is now sensitized to the problems gender-persecuted applicants may face during the inter-
view. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5. 




83. The INS Guidelines cite to the UNHCR Handbook at '1198 which states: "A person 
who, because of his [or her] experiences, was in fear of the authorities in his [or her] own 
country may still feel apprehensive vis-a.-vis any authority. He [or she] may therefore be 
afraid to speak freely and give a full and accurate account of his [or her] case." INS 
Guidelines, supra note 7, at 6 n.lO. 
84. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996) (overturning Immigration 
Judge's denial of asylum where denial was based in part on lack of credibility); see also 
Karen Musalo, In Re Kasinga: A Big Step Forwardfor Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 853, 855, 857-58 (1996) (discussing credibility findings of U and 
BIA). 
85. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46, 
at 9. 
86. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. 
87. Id. at 824 (citing UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 37, at 40-43, T)[71-75). 
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have difficulty discussing past persecution or experiences which were 
"personally degrading, humiliating, or culturally unacceptable. ,,88 The 
Guidelines instruct the Asylum Officers not to initiate the interview with 
questions about sensitive matters such as sexual abuse and violence. 89 
Rather, they should proceed to these issues as the interview progresses.90 
The focus of the interview should be on establishing whether the requisite 
persecution has occurred and the apparent motive of the perpetrator, not the 
precise details of the abuse.91 
Furthermore, the INS Guidelines recognize that "[w]omen who have 
been subject to domestic or sexual abuse may be psychologically trauma-
tized.,,92 This trauma93 may have a significant impact on the applicant's 
testimony94 and should be taken into consideration when evaluating her 
credibility and demeanor. 95 The INS Guidelines notably emphasize that 
when evaluating credibility, Asylum Officers must recognize the effect of 
trauma and culture on an applicant's demeanor and that demeanor is not the 
sole criterion on which credibility should be judged.96 illtimately, poor in-
terview techniques and cross-cultural SkillS,97 and an ignorance of issues 
88. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 6. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. The Proposed Guidelines, following the UNHCR Guidelines, instruct, "[d]o not 
ask for details of sexual abuse; the important thing in establishing a well-founded fear of 
persecution is to establish that some form of it has occurred." Proposed Guidelines, supra 
note 51, at 823 (citing UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 41," 72). 
92. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 7. 
93. The Proposed Guidelines explain that women applicants who are victims of vio-
lence, particularly sexual violence, may exhibit a "pattern of symptoms known as Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder or Rape Trauma Syndrome, that makes it extremely difficult for 
them to testify." Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. The UNHCR Guidelines 
instruct that symptoms of Rape Trauma Syndrome include a loss of self-confidence, persis-
tent fear, difficulty in concentration, a pervasive feeling of loss of control, an attitude of 
self-blame and memory loss or distortion. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823-24 
(citing UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 40-43, Tl71-75). 
94. The Guidelines describe varying effects of trauma on an applicant's demeanor ex-
emplified by emotional passivity and numbness when reciting past persecution, and loss, 
distortion or a complete mental block of memory. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 7. 
95. The INS Guidelines note that cross-cultural sensitivity is required of all Asylum Of-
ficers irrespective of gender and that it is essential to the assessment of credibility and de-
meanor. Demeanor is defined as "how a person handles himselflherself physically," i.e. 
eye contact, body language, and hesitation in speech. Thus, the Officer should be aware 
that although people who avert their gaze from their interviewer in Western cultures are 
perceived as not credible, in certain Asian cultures, it is a sign of respect to avert their eyes 
when speaking to an authority figure. Id. at 6-7. 
96. The INS Guidelines explain the issues of demeanor and credibility further in a foot-
note. The INS emphasizes that although demeanor is relevant to the evaluation of credi-
bility, it should not be used as the exclusive method for this assessment. Rather, demeanor 
should be viewed in conjunction with the overall evaluation of the testimony and evidence 
submitted. See id. at 7 n.1. 
97. See id. at 7. 
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specifically related to gender-based asylum claims, may produce faulty 
negative credibility fmdings which can ultimately result in sending women 
straight back into the hands of their persecutors. Thus, the AOC must make 
every effort to implement these procedural considerations into their adjudi-
cation process. Although the INS adopted a fairly liberal approach to in-
terviewing techniques as evidenced above, unfortunately, it does not main-
tain the same progressive approach in its analysis of the case law. 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER-BASED ASYLUM 
CLAIMS 98 
Building on the "Procedural Considerations" section of the INS 
Guidelines, the "Legal Analysis of Claims,,99 section is designed to instruct 
Asylum Officers on how gender-based asylum claims should be analyzed 
within the framework of United States case law. Due to the complexity of 
these types of asylum claims and the developing nature of the case law, 
this section appropriately constitutes the bulk of the INS Guidelines. How-
ever, despite its appearance of extensive coverage, there are some areas 
which the INS Guidelines do not address at all and others in which the 
analysis could be much more instructive regarding the extant case law. loo 
In its overview of gender-based asylum case law in the United States, 
the Legal Analysis section states that asylum claims of women will often 
have nothing to do with their gender. However, the INS Guidelines also 
point out that an adjudicator should be aware of other cases in which the 
"applicant's gender may bear on the claim in significant ways .... ,,101 
These "other cases" often involve asylum claims which are either gender-
specific or gender-related. 102 Although the INS Guidelines do not explic-
itly categorize gender-based claims into these two categories, they note 
that gender-related claims can raise unique and complex issues.103 Fur-
thermore, because gender-based asylum is a developing area, the INS 
98. Part ill of the INS Guidelines, "Legal Analysis of Claims," is divided into three 
main sections: 1) "Persecution: How Serious Is the Harm?;" 2) "Nexus: The 'On Account 
of Requirement;" and 3) "Public versus Private Acts." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 8, 
10, 16. The analysis of this comment will adhere to this framework, but will expand the 
subsections to include issues not mentioned in the INS Guidelines. 
99. See id. at 8-18. 
100. The author acknowledges that the INS Guidelines are intended to serve only as a 
"guidance" or "considerations" to Asylum Officers. However, as will be discussed in Part 
B of this section, certain areas could have been developed in much greater detail to provide 
a more accurate instruction as to the state of the law regarding gender-based claims. 
101. Id. at 8. 
102. See supra note 56 (providing examples of gender-specific persecution); supra note 57 
(discussing forms of gender-related persecution). 
103. "For example, the applicant may assert a particular kind of harm, like rape, that ei-
ther is unique to women or befalls women more commonly than men. Or an applicant may 
assert that she has suffered persecution on account of her gender or because of her mem-
bership in a social group constituted by women. She might also assert that her alleged 
persecutors seek to harm her on account of a political or religious belief concerning gen-
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Guidelines encourage adjudicators to "freely seek legal counsel regarding 
these issues as the decisional law evolves."l04 Nevertheless, the INS in-
structs that, ultimately, all applications must be "analyzed within the terms 
of United States law.,,105 
A. PERSECUTION 
To prevail on a request for asylum, the applicant must satisfy the frrst 
component under the refugee defmition which requires her to establish past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. She can do this by dem-
onstrating that the harm she fears or has suffered in the past, rises to the 
level of persecution as that term is defmed under the relevant domestic and 
intemationallaw. I06 Due to the absence of a defmition of persecution in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, it has been left up to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals and the courts to defme the term. In Matter of Acosta, 107 
the BIA interpreted persecution to include threats to life, confmement, tor-
ture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life 
or freedom.108 However, "[g]enerally harsh conditions shared by many other 
persons" do not rise to the level of persecution.109 The Ninth Circuit has in-
terpreted persecution to involve "the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ ... in a manner regarded as offensive," 11 0 and where "there 
is a difference between the persecutor's· views or status and that of the vic-
tim; it is oppression which is inflicted because of a difference the persecutor 
will not tolerate.,,111 Consistent with this interpretation, the INS Guidelines 
state that although "discriminatory practices and experiences are not gen-
erally regarded by themselves as persecution, they 'can accumulate. over 
der." INS Guidelines. supra note 7, at 8. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. This statement by the INS further substantiates the conclusion that U.S. case 
law must evolve to a stage where precedents have been set which recognize gender-based 
asylum claims in the multiple contexts in which they arise. 
106. Adjudicators may utilize human rights instruments as a source of human rights 
norms even though the instruments have not been ratified by the United States. Proposed 
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816 n.21 (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra note 29, at 
11-12, 20). Unfortunately, although the INS claims the formulation of numerous human 
rights instruments influenced the issuance of the INS Guidelines, these instruments are 
rarely, if ever, cited in gender-based asylum determinations. In contrast, Canadian adjudi-
cations of gender-based asylum claims often refer to human rights instruments as a basis of 
granting asylum. See Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1182-84. 
107. 191. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). In Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that the same standard should 
apply when adjudicating withholding of deportation and asylum claims. However, in 
Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA held that different standards should apply, thereby overrul-
ing that part of the Acosta decision. 
108. Id. at 222. 
109. Id. 
110. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW 
OOERNATIONALDICTIONARY 1685 (1965)). 
111. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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time or increase in intensity so that they may rise to the level of persecu-
tion.,,,112 
These defmitions of persecution provide a general framework in which 
harm can be evaluated to determine if it rises to the requisite level of perse-
cution. l13 All instances of abuse or harm, whether gender-based or not, must 
be evaluated according to the general principles discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. If the applicant cannot demonstrate that the harm she fears or 
has suffered is commensurate with one of the general principles, her asylum 
claim may be denied. 114 Therefore, the INS Guidelines note that although 
there are particular types of harm which are "unique to or commonly befall 
women," the analysis of abuse should not differ because of the victim's gen-
der.lIS 
1. Non-Conformance with Moral Codes as Persecution 
In the area of violations of fundamental beliefs as persecution, courts 
have taken significant steps towards developing gender-based asylum case 
law. The INS Guidelines acknowledge these steps by discussing two cases 
which were adjudicated in the Third and Ninth circuits. Both Fatin1I6 and 
Fisher1I7 involved Iranian women who feared persecution upon return to 
Iran because of their opposition to the restrictive Islamic laws imposed on 
women by the Khomeini government. In F atin, the Third Circuit held that 
the punishment for non-compliance with the moral code constituted perse-
cution for the purposes of any asylum claim. I IS The court also found that 
"the concept of persecution is broad enough to include governmental 
measures that compel an individual to engage in conduct that is not physi-
112. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9 (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra note 29, at 
22). 
113. Cj. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816 (providing a much more expansive 
definition of what forms of harm constitute persecution). 
114. Because these definitions derive from cases which involved male applicants, gender-
based claims often cannot fit within these constructs as the interpretations are based on a 
particularly male experience. The Proposed Guidelines provide a more expansive inter-
pretation of persecution which would be more inclusive of gender-based harm. For exam-
ple, the Proposed Guidelines state that persecution includes "other serious violations of 
basic human rights as defined by international human rights instruments (including those 
specifically addressing the rights of women)." Id. International human rights instruments 
can provide a "framework for analyzing which types of harm amount to persecution." Id. 
at 816 n.21. ''These human rights instruments need not be ratified by the U.S. to provide 
guidance as a source of human rights norms." Id. (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra 
note 29, at 11-12, 20). See also supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text (examples and 
discussion of human rights instruments specifically addressing the rights of women). 
115. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9. 
116. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). 
117. Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 
1996). See infra notes 308-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the en banc deci-
sion. 
118. The applicant's brief stated that the routine penalty for women who do not comply 
with the moral code is "74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases, brutal rapes 
and death." Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. 
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cally painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individual's deepest be-
liefs.,,1l9 The court further explained that such conduct could be exempli-
fied by "requiring a person to renounce his or her religious beliefs or to 
desecrate an object of religious importance.,,120 
Despite these findings, the Third Circuit determined that the record did 
not demonstrate that Ms. Fatin would risk persecution. Rather, she failed 
to demonstrate that she would risk the consequences of non-compliance, or 
that the imposition of the religious laws would be "so profoundly abhor-
rent" to her beliefs that it would constitute persecution.121 Although the 
court failed to specify what degree of "abhorrence" is required to consti-
tute persecution, it did explain that the level of abhorrence cannot be based 
solely on the subjective reactions of the applicant, but must be objectively 
reasonable.122 The Third Circuit also asserted that "the concept of perse-
cution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, 
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.,,123 Because Ms. Fatin failed 
to establish that she had a valid fear of future persecution, her asylum 
claim was denied. However, Fatin's importance to gender-based asylum 
jurisprudence is undeniable because of the court's permissive definition of 
persecution. 
In Fisher, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Third Circuit's interpretations 
of persecution.124 The applicant in Fisher was an Iranian woman who 
feared persecution based on her refusal to comply with the fundamentalist 
religious and cultural norms. Although the Ninth Circuit distinguished the 
two cases by stating that Fisher "involves a claim of persecution based 
upon forced compliance of the moral codes, not a claim that voluntary 
compliance itself amounts to persecution,,,125 the court affirmed the Third 
Circuit's interpretation of persecution in Fatin. According to the Ninth 
Circuit: 
when a person with religious views different from those espoused 
by a religious regime is required to conform to, or is punished for 
failing to comply with, laws that fundamentally are abhorrent to 
that person's deeply-held religious convictions, the resulting an-
guish should be considered in determining whether the authorities 
have engaged in "extreme conduct" that is "tantamount to perse-
119. Id. at 1242. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of the case 
and the author's criticism of this decision. 
122. Id. at 1242 n.l1. The INS Guidelines explain that the degree of abhorrence would 
have to be shared by a reasonable person in the circumstances of the applicant. INS Guide-
lines, supra note 7, at 10. 
123. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. 
124. Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1375-76. 
125. Id. at 1375. 
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tion."I26 
The Fisher court also emphasized that persecution cannot be defmed so 
narrowly as to be "evaluated solely on the basis of the physical sanction ... 
imposed .... ,,127 By creating two new interpretations of persecution which 
can be utilized by other women applicants to formulate their gender-based 
asylum claims, these cases represent significant developments in the area of 
gender-based asylum law. The INS Guidelines' discussion of these two 
cases implies that persecution for non-compliance with moral codes consti-
tutes a violation of fundamental beliefs, thereby satisfying the persecution 
element of asylum. 
2. Severe Abuse as Persecution 
Severe abuse which is generally specific to women, such as rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, will often be considered persecution under 
the general framework as well. In line with at least two major cases on the 
subject, the INS Guidelines assert that rape and severe sexual violence are 
commensurate with serious physical harm which has consistently been held 
to constitute persecution. In Lazo-Majano v. INS,I28 the Ninth Circuit held 
that an army sergeant's rape and brutalization of a Salvadoran woman who 
he denounced as a subversive constituted persecution within the terms of the 
Refugee Act. Similarly, in In re D-V-, 129 the BIA held that the gang rape 
and beating of a Haitian women amounted to persecution. Severe sexual 
abuse can also be deemed equivalent to torture, beatings, and other forms of 
physical abuse which are commonly interpreted to be persecution. l30 De-
spite these auspicious interpretations, it is generally not the persecution itself 
that the women applicants have difficulty proving in cases involving rape or 
sexual violence. 
Demonstrating that sexual abuse amounts to persecution under the gen-
eral principles does not by itself provide grounds for asylum. Asylum-
seekers must still establish that their fear is well-founded, on account of one 
of the enumerated grounds, and that the persecutor is the government or 
someone the government is unable or unwilling to control.131 If the persecu-
tion that a woman faces is deemed personal, then she generally fails to sat-
isfy the requirement that her persecution be on account of a protected 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1374. The INS Guidelines failed to mention that the Fisher court also held 
that the likelihood of sanctions for inadvertent non-compliance with the moral codes is 
sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 1376. 
128. 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987). 
129. In re D-V-, Int. Dec. 3252 (BIA 1993) was designated as a precedent the same 
month the INS Guidelines were issued. 
130. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9. 
131. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
282 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
ground, and thus is not eligible for asylum.132 
Significantly, the INS Guidelines instruct Asylum Officers not to auto-
matically assume that sexual violence is a purely personal act. 133 However, 
the Guidelines fail to elaborate on this instruction. The Guidelines do not 
explain why an adjudicator would automatically assume that sexual violence 
perpetrated against a woman is purely personal. For instance, when a man 
is beaten, is it automatically assumed that the beating was for purely per-
sonal reasons? Furthermore, the Guidelines do not inform the Asylum Offi-
cers why they should not jump to this conclusion. If they are not provided 
with any context, how will Asylum Officers know when their assumptions 
are inappropriate. If the INS Guidelines had delineated in what situations it 
is appropriate to fmd that the persecution was personal, and in what situa-
tions it was not, the instruction above would have been more useful. 
3. Past Persecution 
While the INS Guidelines outline several ways to establish asylum 
claims based upon a well-founded fear of future persecution, they fail to dis-
cuss the significance of an asylum claim based on past persecution. The 
Guidelines should emphasize that past persecution alone does not constitute 
eligibility for asylum; other requirements must still be met. In addition to 
demonstrating that the abuse suffered amounts to persecution on account of 
one of the protected grounds, a female applicant for asylum based on past 
persecution must also establish that the persecutor was the government or 
someone the government was unable or unwilling to control. 134 Once an 
applicant establishes that the harm she suffered in the past amounts to per-
secution, the INS then bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that conditions in the country from which the applicant fled 
have substantially changed.135 To establish fundamentally changed country 
conditions, the Asylum Officer should supply independent evidence.136 
4. The Case Law Defining/Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution 
The INS is not entirely at fault for the absence of detailed guidance re-
garding evaluating what types of gender-based abuse constitutes persecution 
for purposes of satisfying the statute. Unfortunately, the extant case law 
often does not contain uniform precedents which can be employed by women 
refugees basing their asylum claims on gender persecution. Further devel-
opment of the gender-based asylum case law is necessary for female appli-
132. See infra notes 270-91 and accompanying text. 
133. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9. 
134. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); In re D-V-, Int. Dec. 
3252 (BIA 1993). 
135. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 821-22 nn.57-58. See also Kelly, supra note 
12, at 636 n.45. 
136. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 822 n.57. 
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cants to succeed with claims submitted under this rubric. Applicants' ability 
to meet the refugee defmition requirements is often hindered due to a dearth 
of precedential cases in the area of gender persecution. Although recent de-
cisions have contributed towards a growing body of law, inconsistencies in 
that law are still pervasive.137 It was hoped that the INS Guidelines would 
create a unifying force in the area of gender-based asylum. Rather than 
providing the guidance that was anticipated, the INS Guidelines, merelyem-
phasize the limitations in current case law.138 Although the Guidelines are 
an extremely positive development, the case law must evolve to further fa-
cilitate the fair adjudication of gender-based asylum claims. 
B. THE "ON ACCOUNT OF" REQUlREMENT139 
Once an applicant demonstrates that the harm she fears or has suffered 
in the past rises to the requisite level of persecution, she must then establish 
that the persecution is on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion. Applicants fleeing gender-
based persecution often fmd this requirement of the refugee defmition to be 
the most difficult to satisfy.l40 Because the "key criteria for being a refugee 
are drawn primarily from the realm of public sphere activities dominated by 
men,,,141 the activities of women in the private sphere have been historically' 
ignored. 142 Thus, state persecution of a religious or political minority is 
137. See, e.g., Matter of A- and Z-, A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va. 
Dec. 20, 1994), reported in IJ Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS 
Guidelines Imminent, supra note 25, at 521 (recognizing spousal abuse as persecution for 
asylum purposes); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), re-
ported in IJ Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Muti-
lation, supra note 3, at 1188 (recognizing female genital mutilation and spousal abuse as 
grounds for asylum eligibility). But see More on IJ Decision Granting Asylum Based on 
Genital Mutilation, supra note 5, at 1265 (discussing gender-based asylum case in which 
U denied asylum application holding female genital mutilation did not constitute persecu-
tion for purposes of asylum). 
138. See INS Publishes Gender Persecution Guidelines, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 
(1995) ("Ms. Beasley cautioned that the INS guidelines to some extent emphasize the 
limitations in current case law, while the 1994 proposed guidelines supported an expan-
sive reading of the case law."). 
139. The INS Guidelines only discuss two of the five grounds of asylum, political opinion 
and membership in a particular social group. Although these are the two grounds under 
which most gender-based asylum claims will be presented, this comment will discuss all 
five grounds because gender-based claims can conceivably be brought under all of them. 
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817-21. 
140. "[W]omen are much less likely than men to be found to meet the eligibility criteria 
for refugee status because of the absence of explicit recognition of gender based persecu-
tion, and because of the social and political context in which the claims of women are ad-
judicated." Kelly, supra note 12, at 627. Some asylum advocates have called for the ad-
dition of a 6th category for gender in the refugee definition. See id. at 627 n.7; Kristin E. 
Kandt, Note, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender Using 
Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137 (1995). 
141. Kelly, supra note 12, at 628. 
142. [d. at 627-28. 
, ·f-'R·· 
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grounds for asylum, whereas gender persecution at home is not.143 
The INS Guidelines acknowledge the difficulty of satisfying the "on ac-
count of' element when presenting gender-based claims,l44 but emphasize 
that this component is "a critical part of the analysis under U.S. law.,,145 
Despite this emphasis, the Guidelines tend to discuss this element generally 
rather than specifically. For example, the INS Guidelines generally explain 
that satisfaction of the "on account of' element requires that the persecution 
must be "inflicted in order to punish the victim for having one or more of the 
characteristics protected under the statute."l46 However, the Guidelines do 
not provide enough specific examples of persecution women may face on 
account of one or more of the protected categories which would satisfy the 
requirements of the statute. 
1. Race, Nationality and Religion 
The INS Guidelines fail to discuss or even mention claims presented by 
women applicants who face persecution on account of their race, nationality 
or religion. There is no case law known to this author specifically address-
ing gender-based persecution on account of race or nationality. However, 
there are several significant cases in the gender-based asylum area regarding 
persecution on account of religion that should have been discussed in the 
Guidelines. 147 The fact that the Proposed Guidelines, Canadian Guide-
lines, and the UNHCR Guidelines all specify possible gender-based asylum 
claims which can arise on account of race, religion, and nationality indicates 
that this is yet another oversight by the INS. 
Unlike the INS Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines and the Canadian 
Guidelines both recognize certain situations where a woman may allege fear 
of persecution or past persecution on account of her race and her gender. 148 
For example, an indigenous woman may be persecuted for her race as well 
as her gender. 149 Additionally, in circumstances where a discriminatory law 
"causes a woman to lose her citizenship because of marriage to a foreign 
143. Id. at 628. 
144. Unlike the Canadian Guidelines, the INS Guidelines do not attempt to ameliorate 
this problem by creating a structure which enables female applicants to formulate a claim 
which fits within one of the 5 grounds. The Canadian Guidelines created an analytical 
framework for gender-based asylum claims which adjudicators can employ to determine if 
the applicant's claim falls within one of the five enumerated categories. See CANADIAN 
GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 2-6. 
145. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 10. 
146. Id. See also Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. at 226. 
147. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156-74 and ac-
companying text. 
148. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818 (citing CANADIAN GUIDEUNES, supra 
note 46, at 4). The Canadian Guidelines provide the example of an Asian woman living in 
an African society who may be persecuted because of her race and her gender. CANADIAN 
GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4. 
149. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818. 
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national or other related actions," a gender-based asylum claim of persecu-
tion or fear of persecution on account of nationality may exist.150 
The Proposed Guidelines and the Canadian Guidelines also acknowl-
edge that in some cultures, women may face persecution on account of their 
particular religious practices or beliefs. "In the context of the refugee defi-
nition, the concept of religion may encompass the freedom to hold a belief 
system of one's choice or not to hold a particular belief system, and the 
freedom to practice,a religion of one's choice or not to practice a prescribed 
religion. ,,151 Women may be subjected to harm on account of their refusal to 
practice a prescribed religion, hold particular beliefs, or conform their be-
havior according to the teachings of the prescribed religion. 152 
The Proposed Guidelines explain that in nations where there is no sepa-
ration of church and state or where the government is a theocracy, women 
may face persecution on account of their religion because they choose not to 
follow the tenets of the prescribed religion. 153 A woman who fails to "fulfill 
her assigned role" and fears persecutory retaliation, may be able to establish 
a claim for asylum based on religious persecution. l54 As stated above in re-
lation to race, women can also face persecution on account of their religion 
and their gender. For example, a woman may fear harm due to her religious 
beliefs, and the type of harm or punishment she fears may be gender-
specific, such as rape. Similarly, a woman who does not comply with a re-
ligious law which is directed only at women, may face persecution on ac-
count of her gender and her religion. 155 
The failure of the INS Guidelines to discuss the persecution of women 
on account of race, nationality, or religion should not be interpreted as an 
indication of an absence of case law on these issues. In fact, recent deci-
sions in the United States have contributed significantly to the development 
of gender-based asylum law, specifically in relation to the enforcement of 
moral codes against women in Muslim Fundamentalist societies. 156 In Har-
tooni v. INS,157 the applicant's claim was based on a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of religion. Ms. Hartooni was a practicing Arme-
nian Christian living in Iran. 15S Not only did she face persecution on account 
of her religion but also on account of her gender. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that at the time of Ms. Hartooni's application for political asylum, Christian 
150. Id. 
151. Id. See also CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4. 
152. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. In this example, the woman's religious beliefs may be contrary to the prescribed re-
ligion and thus compel her non-compliance. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text 
(discussing the three judge panel's decision in Fisher v.INS). 
156. Notably, all three cases were adjudicated in the Ninth Circuit. 
157. 21 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1994). 
158. Id. at 339. 
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Armenians living in Iran were presumably eligible for asylum under State 
Department policy. 159 The court required Ms. Hartooni to provide evidence 
of "general persecution of a protected group,,,I60 as well as to "demonstrate 
'a specific inference of personal danger. ",161 
Ms. Hartooni not only faced attacks directed at her on account of her 
religion, 162 but she also faced harm due to her gender. On two occasions the 
applicant was detained by soldiers because her hair was not properly bound 
according to the religious laws. 163 On the fIrst occasion, Ms. Hartooni was 
threatened with prison if she was caught with her hair improperly bound 
again. l64 Although she managed to escape from the soldiers on the second 
occasion, some of her friends were "taken away for a few days.,,165 Thus as 
a person practicing a religion different from that prescribed by the govern-
ment, Ms. Hartooni was singled out for persecution on account of her relig-
ion. 
Furthermore, as a female forced to comply with laws directed only at 
her gender or suffer the consequences of non-compliance,l66 Ms. Hartooni 
also faced gender-related persecution. However, the court did not designate 
these incidents as gender-related. Rather, the court stated "[w]e need not 
here decide whether these latter items were religious in character.,,167 The 
court's failure to defme these "latter items" as gender-related exemplifies a 
consistent problem in developing gender-based asylum law. Courts often 
adhere to the traditional asylum constructs, which are based on male claim-
ants rather than interpreting or clarifying the law to be more receptive to 
gender-persecuted claimants. 
In yet another important case, the Ninth Circuit held in Fisher v. INS 
that enforcement of moral codes upon Iranian women can constitute perse-
cution on account of religion. 168 Ms. Fisher argued "that the moral codes 
159. Id. at 341. "By virtue of their faith alone, Christian Armenians in Iran demonstrated 
a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol." Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. (citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509,515-16 (9th Cir. 1985». 
162. For example, the Armenian Christian school that Ms. Hartooni attended was closed 
by the government; she was not allowed to celebrate Christmas; and Iranian soldiers stoned 




166. Failing to comply with the moral codes can result in punishment which includes "74 
lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes and death." Fatin v. INS, 12 
F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting applicant's brief). See supra notes 116-27 and 
accompanying text (discussing whether non-compliance with moral codes constitutes per-
secution). 
167. Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 341. 
168. Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane, 79 F.3d 955 
(9th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the en bane panel's reversal of this decision, see infra 
notes 308-31 and accompanying text. 
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are persecutory because they represent a conception of Islam that she fmds 
abhorrent and because the regime is attempting to suppress her beliefs 
through sanctioning her for noncompliance with the moral codes. ,,169 Con-
trary to previous asylum cases based on the enforcement of moral codes as 
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group,170 Ms. 
Fisher claimed her persecution was on account of her religion. I71 Because 
her conception of Islam differed considerably from the government's, Ms. 
Fisher argued that imposing a conception of Islam on her that she fmds ab-
horrent constituted persecution on account of her religion. l72 The court ac-
cepted her argument but instructed that to demonstrate persecution on ac-
count of religion, Ms. Fisher must show "that the moral codes are likely to 
be enforced against her because of the authorities' intent to punish her for 
her actual or imputed beliefs.,,173 Moreover, the court asserted that Ms. 
Fisher need not inform the Iranian regime of her opposing views to establish 
that she will purposely fail to comply with the moral codes.174 
Despite these important case developments, the INS Guidelines do not 
even discuss these cases or the issues raised in them. The failure to ac-
knowledge case law regarding persecution on account of religion and the 
possibility of persecution on account of race and nationality represents one 
of the many significant deficiencies inherent in the INS Guidelines. 
2. Actual or Imputed Political Opinion 
In addition to raising claims of persecution on account of race, national-
ity, or religion, gender-based asylum applicants also may raise claims of 
persecution on account of political opinion. The applicant's political opin-
ion may be one which is her own, such as feminism, or a persecutor may 
impute a political opinion to her that she does not in actuality possess. The 
Proposed Guidelines assert that "the term political opinion should be un-
derstood to include an opinion regarding the treatment or status of women 
169. Id. at 1374. 
170. Ms. Fisher, as well as the applicants in Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994) 
and Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), based their claims on persecution on ac-
count of political opinion. 
171. "Fisher does not maintain that her voluntary compliance with the moral codes would 
amount to persecution. . . . Rather, she contends that the moral codes are persecutory be-
cause they represent a conception of Islam that she finds abhorrent and because the regime 
is attempting to suppress her beliefs through sanctioning her for noncompliance with the 
moral codes." Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1374. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 1377. 
174. /d. "As the Fifth Circuit noted recently, to require 'martyrdom' is to 'ignore reality in 
general and reasonable human behavior in particular. '" Id. (citing Revis-Martinez v. INS, 
997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993». Cf. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (finding that petitioner's 
testimony did not bring petitioner within social group of Iranian women who refuse to con-
form with Islamic religious requirements). 
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within [their] country, culture or social, religious or ethnic groUp.,,175 In 
contrast to persecution on account of race, nationality, or religion, the INS 
Guidelines do acknowledge and discuss persecution on account of both ac-
tual and imputed political opinion as a basis for asylum. However, their 
treatment of this basis for asylum is cursory at best and excludes case law 
which is particularly relevant to this area. 
a. Political Opinion 
In Fatin v. INS, the Third Circuit had "little doubt that feminism quali-
fies as a political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes.,,176 
The court also stated 'that political opinion could be given a narrower defmi-
tion such as "the opinion that Iran's 'gender-specific laws and repressive 
social norms' must be disobeyed on grounds of conscience.,,177 Despite 
these two progressive holdings, the court denied Ms. Fatin's asylum claim. 
Although she demonstrated that she was a feminist, she failed to show that 
the harm a woman may face for being a feminist in Iran rose to the level of 
persecution. 178 According to the court, Ms. Fatin also failed to demonstrate 
that she possessed the narrower political opinion that Iran's repressive social 
norms and gender-specific laws must be disobeyed. 179 The Third Circuit 
held that while Ms. Fatin did demonstrate that the punishment she would 
face for disobedience constituted persecution, she failed to show that she in-
tended non-compliance.I80 
The INS Guidelines claim that regardless of the outcome, Fatin "does 
make clear that an applicant who could demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of her (or his) beliefs about the role and status of 
women in society could be eligible for refugee status on account of political 
opinion. ,,181 However, despite the veracity of this statement, it ignores the 
reality of the inherent difficulty in presenting gender-based asylum claims. 
The holding in F atin can be perceived as being purely arbitrary. Ultimately, 
175. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817. 
176. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242. 
177. Id. at 1243. 
178. Id. Ms. Fatin's brief contained a passage detailing the consequences of not wearing a 
veil in public. "In April 1983, the government adopted a law imposing one year's impris-
onment on any women caught in public without the traditional Islamic veil, the Chador. 
However, from reports, it is clear that in many instances the revolutionary guards. " take 
the law into their own hands and abuse the transgressing women." Id. at 1237. 
Despite evidence that feminists in Iran manifest their opposition to traditional Islamic 
law by not wearing a veil, and that such action can subject women to abuse, the Fatin Court, 
nevertheless, limited its decision by holding that maintaining a feminist political opinion in 
Iran does not rise to the level of persecution. The Fatin Court's decision reflects the con-
cern of other courts with going "too far" in their development of gender-based asylum law. 
See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 
285 (5th Cir. 1987); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
179. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1243. 
180. Id. 
181. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11. 
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whether Ms. Fatin' s asylum claim would be approved or denied was de-
pendent solely on her statements regarding whether or not she would wear 
the veil. When asked by the Immigration Judge whether she would wear the 
veil or submit to arrest and punishment, Ms. Fatin stated "[i]f I go back, I 
would try personally to avoid it as much as I could."ls2 Because she was not 
defInitive enough in her refusal to wear the veil, her asylum claim was de-
nied. IS3 It appears from the court's holding that if Ms. Fatin had said, "I 
would rather submit to arrest and punishment than wear the veil," then her 
asylum claim would have been granted. Thus, a mere alteration in words 
could have resulted in a significantly different result. l84 
Although the Fatin Court developed important dicta regarding gender-
based claims, it ultimately sent a woman back to persecution because she 
was reluctant to become a martyr. ISS The holding in this case further ex-
emplifIes the problems with current gender-based asylum law, which include 
many decisions that may provide important dicta, but not precedents which 
can be cited as authority by subsequent gender-based asylum claimants. By 
providing a cursory summary of these cases, the INS Guidelines only em-
phasize, rather than alleviate, such shortcomings. 
b. Imputed Political Opinion 
In addition to discussing political opinion, the INS Guidelines make an 
important concession by recognizing imputed political opinion as a basis for 
asylum. However, their discussion of imputed political opinion falls short of 
being truly effective by failing to mention notable holdings which specifi-
cally address this area of gender-based asylum law. Instead, the INS 
Guidelines merely instruct that "in addition to the question whether views on 
issues that relate to gender can constitute a 'political opinion' under the 
INA," Asylum Officers also must evaluate claims in which women assert 
that they have been persecuted on account of the political opinion that was 
imputed to them by their persecutor. IS6 
182. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1236. 
183. Cf, Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d at 1377 ("Of course, just as Fisher need not show that she 
purposefully will fail to comply with moral codes, it is not necessary for her to intend to 
make her views known to the Iranian regime."). 
184. Cf, Moghaddam v. INS, No. 93-70854, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 37066 (9th Cir. Dec. 
16, 1994) (holding "enforcement of the moral codes to suppress either religious or political 
beliefs may be persecution;" applicants do not need to take conscious steps to violate the 
moral codes to meet burden of well-founded fear of persecution). 
185. See Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1377 ("[T]o require 'martyrdom' is to 'ignore reality in general 
and reasonable human behavior in particular."'); see also Pamela Goldberg, U.S. Law and 
Women Asylum Seekers: Where Are They and Where Are They Going?, 73 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 889, 894 (1996) ("The fallacy in the Fatin ... decision is that an individual must 
show that she would 'choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance' in order 
to establish the depth of her conviction. Nowhere else in asylum law has an applicant been 
required to meet such a high standard."). 
186. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11. 
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The INS selected Campos-Guardado v. INS187 to illustrate the imputed 
political opinion doctrine to its Officers. 188 The Fifth Circuit denied the 
applicant's claim of persecution on account of imputed political opinion 
concluding that she failed to establish that her persecutors imputed a politi-
cal opinion to her which motivated their attack. Notably, the INS Guide-
lines state "[r]easonable minds could differ over this record" considering the 
facts which indicated that the persecutors "believed the petitioner to have 
contrary political views and that they punished her because of [them].,,189 
The INS concedes that this case illustrates the need for Asylum Officers to 
"carefully ascertain all the facts surrounding an allegation of persecution in 
order to assess whether there are indicia that the act was committed or 
threatened on account of a protected characteristic."I90 
Although the INS provides a generous interpretation of Campos-
Guardado in its Guidelines, it fails to discuss or even mention other relevant 
case law regarding imputed political opinion. For instance, there is no men-
tion of Lazo-Majano v. INS,191 decided by the Ninth Circuit the same year 
the Fifth Circuit decided Campos-Guardado, but with remarkably different 
results. The decision issued by the Ninth Circuit in Lazo-Majano marked a 
significant development in gender-based asylum law. The court held that the 
persecutor's "cynical" imputation of a subversive political opinion to the 
applicant constituted persecution on account of political opinion.192 By im-
puting his unsubstantiated belief that the applicant was a subversive, the 
persecutor subjected Ms. Lazo-Majano to severe abuse and caused her to 
fear further persecution in the future. 193 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that 
"[o]ne cannot have a more compelling example of a political opinion gen-
erating political persecution than the opinion that is held by a subversive in 
opposition to the govemment."l94 Although the sergeant knew that Ms. 
Lazo-Majano was not a subversive, but only "a poor domestic and washer-
woman," he SUbjected her to constant persecution by imputing a political 
opinion to her. 195 By leaving this case out of its discussion of imputed po-
litical opinion, the INS prevents information from reaching the Asylum Offi-
cers that may be crucial to women's asylum claims. 
Unlike the INS Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines provide specific 
examples of women who may be persecuted on account of a political belief 
187. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a brief 
synopsis of the facts. 
188. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a brief 
synopsis of the facts. 
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ascribed to them. l96 A woman who refuses to subordinate herself to the 
cultural or social dominance of men in her society or who criticizes institu-
tionalized discrimination against women may fear persecution on account of 
her actual or imputed political opinion. l97 The Proposed Guidelines explain 
that the political opinion may be attributed to her if "she is perceived by the 
established politicaVsocial structure as expressing politically antagonistic 
views through her actions or her failure to act.,,198 Furthermore, political 
opinions may be imposed "for any reason, including her refusal or inability 
to conform to religious or cultural norms or the roles assigned to women 
within her country or culture."I99 
The imputed political opinion claim presented by the applicant in Fisher 
v. INS200 would aptly fall under this defmition provided in the Proposed 
Guidelines. In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a "'totality of the 
circumstances' approach is a viable means of demonstrating persecution on 
account of an imputed political opinion. ,,201 Ms. Fisher argued that a 
"combination of factors" indicated that the government's interest in her was 
politically motivated.202 These factors included her brother-in-Iaw's known 
opposition to the regime and her own record of noncompliance with the 
moral codes.203 The court acknowledged that because of the recorded viola-
tions of the moral code "the authorities are likely to impute to Fisher 'enemy 
of the regime' status.,,204 Thus, if Ms. Fisher can show on remand that she 
would be viewed as an "enemy of the regime," her asylum claim of persecu-
tion on account of imputed political persecution may be granted.205 
The INS Guidelines' abbreviated discussion of imputed political opinion 
demonstrates again the inherent shortcomings of the Guidelines themselves 
and the gender-based asylum case law. The INS' failure to include Lazo-
Majano206 in its imputed political opinion analysis constitutes a disturbing 
deficiency. A comparison of Lazo-Majano and Campos-Guardado'11J7 fur-
ther illustrates the inconsistencies in the law. The Ninth Circuit appears to 
be consistent in its treatment of imputed political opinion, but this consis-
tency will only benefit women applicants who file claims within the reach of 
this Circuit. Because the BIA and Immigration Judges are bound by the 
precedents in the Circuit in which they are located, this can result in BIA 
196. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817-18. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. (citing CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4). 
199. Id. 
200. 61 F.3d 1366. 





206. 813 F.2d 1432. 
207. 809 F.2d 285. 
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judges also issuing conflicting opinions. BIA precedents, United States Su-
preme Court decisions, or a change in the underlying law appear to provide 
the best means of creating a uniform body of gender-based asylum law. 208 
3. Membership in a Particular Social Group 
The last basis of asylum, membership in a particular social group, is a 
difficult asylum claim on which to prevail because it is "the least clearly de-
fmed ground for eligibility as a refugee.,,209 A specific defmition of the 
phrase does not exist in either the INA or the regulations.210 In Fatin, the 
Third Circuit cited to numerous courts and commentators that have strug-
gled to defme this category. 211 Although commentators have advocated for a 
liberal reading of this asylum ground,212 the BIA adopted a more restrictive 
analysis213 in Matter of Acosta. 214 In that case, the BIA defmed membership 
in a particular group as "persecution that is directed toward an individual 
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immu-
table characteristic. ,,215 The shared characteristic can be either innate, such 
as sex, kinship ties, or color, or a shared past experience such as land own-
ership or military leadership.216 The BIA also instructed that the group 
characteristic that will qualify "remains to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.,,217 The shared characteristic must be one that either the members 
cannot change or should not be required to change because it is fundamental 
to their identity or conscience.218 
The INS Guidelines adopt the defmition of membership in a particular 
social group provided by the BIA in Matter of Acosta as well as the Ninth 
Circuit's test in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.219 In Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth 
Circuit developed a four-prong test to evaluate claims premised on member-
ship in a particular social groUp.22O The adjudicator must determine: 
208. For a discussion of recent decisions on gender-based asylum claims, see infra notes 
307-72 and accompanying text. 
209. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12. 
210. Kelly, supra note 12, at 647. 
211. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238 nn.4-5. 
212. ''The intent of the framers of the Refugee Convention was not to redress prior perse-
cution of social groups, but rather to save individuals from future injustice. The 'social 
group' category was meant to be a catch-all which could include all the bases for and types 
of persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up." Kelly, supra note 12, at 
647-48 (citing Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group 
as a Basisfor Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39,41-42,45 (1983». 
213. Kelly, supra note 12, at 648. 
214. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 191. & 
N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
215. Id. at 233. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12. 
216. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. 801 F.2d 1572 (9th Cir. 1986). 
220. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12-13. 
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1) whether the class of people identified by the asylum applicant is 
cognizable as a particular social group under the applicable laws; 2) 
whether the applicant qualifies as a member of the group; 3) 
whether the group has in fact been targeted for persecution on ac-
count of the characteristics of the group members; and 4) whether 
"special circumstances" are present that would justify regarding 
mere membership in the group in itself as sufficient to recognize the 
1· fu 221 app lcant as a re gee. 
293 
The INS Guidelines note that the special circumstances prong is appli-
cable only when the applicant alleges mere membershif in the social group 
as the basis for her well-founded fear of persecution.22 In addition to pro-
viding the above defmitions, the INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum Offi-
cers that the particular social group category can overlap with claims predi-
cated on the other categories, i.e. race, religion, political opinion, or 
nationality.223 
However, the INS does not delineate the requirements for establishing a 
well-founded fear of future persecution. The "well-founded fear" standard 
consists of both objective and subjective components. An applicant can 
satisfy the subjective component through her credible testimony that she 
genuinely fears persecution.224 The objective component may be satisfied by 
showing specific and credible evidence of facts supporting a reasonable fear 
of persecution on the enumerated ground.225 The burden is on the applicant 
to meet this standard.226 An applicant is not required to demonstrate that she 
has been singled out for persecution to establish a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution.227 Rather, to prevail on her claim, she can show that "there 
is a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated women on account 
of their membership in the particular social group to which the applicant 
221. Id. at 13 (citing Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75). Cj. Kelly, supra note 12, at 
650 (defining the four criteria as: "1) a close affiliation between members of the group, 2) a 
common impulse or interest upon which the affiliation is based, 3) a voluntary association, 
and 4) the existence of a common trait by which group members are distinguishable from 
the general population"). Once a discernible social group has been established, the adjudi-
cator must further consider "whether the applicant has demonstrated that she is a member of 
the group ... [and] that the group has, in fact, been targeted for persecution." Kelly, supra 
note 12, at 650 n.120, (citing Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75). 
222. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. See also Kelly, supra note 12, at 650 n.l20 
(discussing "special circumstances" requirement). 
223. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12. The INS Guidelines also cite to the UNHCR 
Handbook's discussion of the particular social group category, explaining that the UNHCR 
Handbook's example illustrates how a claim based on membership in a particular social 
group could be construed as persecution on account of political opinion. Id. at 12 n.12. 
224. Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1370 (citing Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1996)). 
227. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816. 
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belongs. ,,228 
a. Social Group Defined by Gender 
After providing a general defmition of "membership in a particular 
group," the INS Guidelines discuss gender and family membership as a ba-
sis of a social group. An increasing number of women refugees present 
asylum claims predicated on the membership in a particular social group 
ground. The applicants assert that "gender, alone or along with other char-
acteristics,,,229 can defme the particular social group of which they are a 
member and because of this membership, they have suffered or will suffer 
persecution. 
The INS Guidelines note230 that although the Second Circuit has held 
that gender alone cannot defme a particular social group,231 other circuits 
have taken a different view.232 In Gomez v. INS, the Second Circuit consid-
ered the application of a woman who claimed that she had been persecuted 
on account of her membership in a particular social group of "women who 
have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas.,,233 The 
court rejected this formulation stating, "[p ]ossession of broadly-based char-
acteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with 
membership in a particular social groUp.,,234 The INS Guidelines fail to 
mention, however, that the Second Circuit limited its holding to the facts of 
the case. Despite its rejection of Ms. Gomez' claim, the Second Circuit 
stated, "we do not suggest that women who have been repeatedly and sys-
tematically brutalized by particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded 
fear of persecution. ,,235 This statement implies that the holding was based on 
the particular facts of the case and the applicant's failure to demonstrate a 
well-founded fear of persecution, rather than a categorical denial of social 
groups based on gender. 236 
Although the INS Guidelines fail to note the limited holding in Gomez, 
they do discuss other cases that differ from the Second Circuit's decision. 
For example, the Third Circuit in F atin found that Iranian women who fear 
persecution because of their gender constitute a particular social group un-
der the INA.237 Ms. Fatin failed to show, however, that members of this 
228. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13(b)(2)(i)). See also Brazilian, Iranian Gay Men 
Granted Asylum, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1310 (1995) (two homosexual males were 
granted asylum on the basis of meeting the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)). 
229. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. 
230. Id. 
231. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). 
232. See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233; Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994). 
233. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663. 
234. Id. at 664. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. 
235. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664. 
236. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818-19 n.38. 
237. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. 
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group faced the requisite level of persecution based solely on their gen-
der.238 The INS Guidelines also note that in a factually similar case, Safaie 
v. INS, the Eighth Circuit239 appeared to hold that gender could not be a 
defining characteristic of a particular social group. The applicant argued 
that Iranian women are a particular social group by virtue of their innate 
characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon them.240 In 
Safaie, the Eighth Circuit rejected her argument asserting that "this cate-
gory is overbroad, because no fact-finder could reasonably conclude that 
all Iranian women [have] a well-founded fear of persecution based solely 
on their gender.,,241 The INS Guidelines contend, however, that although 
the court's statement may appear to reject gender as a defining character-
istic of a social group, that was not it's actual intent. 242 Despite its 
"imprecise language," the Safaie Court cited to the portion of Fatin which 
recognized that gender is a viable "shared characteristic" under the INA. 243 
Thus, as the INS Guidelines note, although some courts have recognized 
particular social groups based on gender as a legal matter, there has been no 
fmding as a factual matter that membership in this group can result in harm 
which rises to the level of persecution.244 In contrast, the courts have rec-
ognized that gender combined with other characteristics can constitute a 
particular social group which meets the refugee defmition. For example, in 
Fatin, the court held that a narrower group, limited to women who would 
rather risk persecution for noncompliance than conform to the moral codes, 
could be deemed an eligible social group. 245 A woman possessing such be-
liefs that "might well be so fundamental to her identity or conscience" should 
not be forced to change them.246 The court also found that the punishment 
inflicted on members of this group is harsh enough to constitute persecu-
tion.247 The INS Guidelines conclude that the Fatin court recognized three 
groups248 based solely on or in part on gender which could constitute a par-
238. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. 
239. Safaie, 25 F.3d 636. 
240. Id. at 640. 
241. Id. 
242. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13 n.13. 
243. Id. As in Fatin, the applicant in Safaie failed to present evidence that demonstrated 
that Iranian women would be singled out for persecution based on their gender alone. 
244. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. Cj. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (defining 
membership in a particular social group as a group of persons who share a common immu-
table characteristic such as sex). 
245. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241, accord Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640. 
246. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 14. 
247. However, the applicants in Fatin and Sajaie failed to demonstrate that they were 
members of this particular subgroup. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241; Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640. 
248. The three groups include: a group based solely on gender; "a subgroup of Iranian 
women who find their country's gender-specific laws offensive and do not wish to comply 
with them," and "Iranian women whose opposition to Iran's gender-specific laws is so pro-
found that they would disobey at serious peril." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 14. 
5 t V'~ 
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ticular social group, but only one social group could satisfy all the require-
ments of the refugee defmition.249 
The INS Guidelines further instruct the Asylum Officers to consider 
additional characteristics, likely to be recognized by persecutors, that 
might combine with gender to define a particular social groUp.250 In 
Gomez v. INs/51 the applicant combined the characteristic of gender with 
the shared past experience252 of rape and battering at the hands of Salva-
doran guerrillas. Yet, the Second Circuit denied her claim, "finding that 
she had failed to produce evidence that persons in this group could be 
identified as members by would-be persecutors and would be targeted for 
further harm on the basis of their common characteristic-that is, having 
been harmed by the guerrillas in the past.,,253 
After the analysis of Gomez, the INS Guidelines end their discussion of 
social groups defmed by gender. There are no instructions as to which char-
acteristics might combine with gender to create a viable claim of asylum. 
The INS Guidelines also fail to develop a framework which Asylum Officers 
can utilize when adjudicating claims under the 'least clearly defmed' asylum 
ground. The INS Guidelines' truncated discussion is most likely due in part 
to the dearth of precedent setting cases in this area, further substantiating the 
conclusion that the case law must evolve to create a legal environment in 
which gender-based asylum claims can be adequately adjudicated. 
b. Social Group Defined by Family Membership 
The INS Guidelines note that in addition to social groups defmed by 
gender, asylum seekers also allege claims of past or future persecution due 
to a family relationship.254 In Matter of Acosta, the BIA instructed that 
"kinship ties" can be a common characteristic creating a particular social 
group under the INA. 255 In accordance with this holding, the First Circuit 
held in Gebremichael v. INS256 that "[t]here can, in fact, be no plainer ex-
ample of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable char-
acteristics than that of a nuclear family.,,257 The Gebremichael court points 
249. That group was "the narrowest sub-group of Iranian women whose opposition to 
Iran's gender-specific laws is so profound that they would disobey at serious peril." Id. 
The INS Guidelines state that this holding is consistent with Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. at 233 (holding "sex" is an immutable characteristic), and with the UNHCR Execu-
tive Committee's 1993 Conclusion, supra note 45. 
250. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15. 
251. 947 F.2d 660. 
252. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
253. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664). 
254. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15. 
255. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
256. 10 F.3d 28 (lst Cir. 1993). The applicant in Gebremichael was an Ethiopian man 
who was imprisoned and tortured by the Dergue government seeking information about his 
brother. 
257. Id. at 36. 
'-.~ 
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to the "time honored theory of cherchez La famille ('look for the family')" 
employed by the applicant's persecutors which involves the "terrorization of 
one family member to extract information about the location of another 
family member or to force the family member to come forward.,,258 This 
theory creates a clear link between family membership and persecution that 
no reasonable fact-fmder could fail to notice.259 In addition to discussing the 
theory set forth in GebremichaeL, the INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum 
Officers to consider the holding in Ravindran v. INS which stated: "a proto-
typical example of a 'particular social group' would consist of the immedi-
ate members of a certain family, the family being the focus of fundamental 
affiliation concerns and common interests for most people.,,260 
The INS Guidelines note that prior to these cases, the Ninth Circuit 
found that persecution on account of membership in a particular social 
group did not extend to the persecution of a family. 261 These divergent 
holdings illustrate again the inconsistencies in the law. The First Circuit 
recognizes the family as a particular social group for asylum purposes, 
whereas the Ninth Circuit does not. However, the INS Guidelines state that 
although the law may be uncertain in the Ninth Circuit, the BIA and other 
federal courts have recognized family membership as a valid particular so-
cial group under the asylum laws.262 The INS Guidelines also direct that 
gender need not play any role in whether family membership can defme a 
particular social groUp.263 Asylum Officers should be aware of the law in 
this area because female applicants from countries where men tend to be 
more politically active than women will often assert claims based on family 
membership.264 
Throughout its discussion on social groups defmed by family member-
ship, surprisingly, the INS fails to discuss Campos-Guardado,265 in which 
the Fifth Circuit denied the applicant's asylum claim based on imputed po-
litical opinion and membership in a particular social groUp.266 The court did 
not consider the applicant's particular social group claim because it "relies 
258. Id. (citations omitted). 
259. Id. 
260. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 n.5 
(lst Cir. 1992) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576». 
261. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 
916,919 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit did not mention Sanchez-Trujillo in its deci-
sion nor did it explore the issue of a social group based on family membership in depth. 
INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15. 
262. Id. at 15-16. 
263. However, although the persecution may not be gender-based, it may be gender-
specific. For example, the type of persecution inflicted on female family members may be 
specific to their gender (i.e. rape). See, e.g., Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d 285 (after being 
forced to watch murder of relatives, applicant was raped). 
264. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16. 
265. 809 F.2d 285. 
266. Id. at 288. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a brief synopsis of the facts. 
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upon the attackers' alleged attribution of political opinions to the family 
group, [thus] we focus on the scope of the statutory term 'political opin-
ion. ",267 Despite the facts of the case which indicate a viable claim of perse-
cution on account of the applicant's family membership, the court does not 
even review the issue. 268 A comparison of Campos-Guardado and Gebre-
michael would have been useful to instruct the Asylum Officers that Cam-
pos-Guardado, as the INS recognized previously, may not be a case on 
which Asylum Officers should rely because "reasonable minds could differ" 
over the record. 
Although a large portion of the INS Guidelines are devoted to the cate-
gory of membership in a particular social group, there are many deficiencies 
in its analysis. Relevant cases are not cited and a framework by which 
Asylum Officers could approach these claims is not provided. The INS 
Guidelines merely seem to point out the complexities of claims in this area 
and the inconsistencies in the case law. In contrast, both the Proposed 
Guidelines and the Canadian Guidelines provide a framework and consid-
erations for adjudicators to utilize when evaluating claims based on mem-
bership in a particular social group. 269 A more structured approach in the 
INS Guidelines would provide a useful mechanism which Asylum Officers 
could employ to perform more efficient and uniform adjudications. 
C. PUBLICVS. PRIVATE ACTS 
Mter establishing that she has faced past persecution or has a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of one of the enumerated 
grounds, the applicant must still satisfy two further requirements. She must 
demonstrate that 1) the agent of persecution was either the government or 
someone the government is unwilling or unable to control; and 2) that gov-
ernment protection is not available in another part of the country. The INS 
Guidelines note that these two requirements are "based on the notion that 
international protection becomes appropriate where national protection is 
unavailable. ,,270 Thus, if an applicant is not adequately protected by her 
government, then she has the right to seek protection elsewhere and be 
granted asylum if she satisfies the requirements of the refugee defmition. 
Case law has interpreted inadequate p~otection to mean, in part, that the per-
secution is inflicted by the government or by someone the government is 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 287. 
269. See CANADIAN GUIDEUNES, supra note 46, at 5-7; Proposed Guidelines, supra note 
51, at 818-21. The Proposed Guidelines' extensive analysis of the membership in a par-
ticular social group asylum category is derived from an expansive reading of the case law. 
It provides a framework which is receptive to gender-based asylum claims and which 
supplies a more useful and instructive tool for Asylum Officers to utilize in their adjudica-
tions. 
270. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16. 
------------------..-.~~--"""'""'-
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unwilling or unable to control. 271 
The INS Guidelines state that in the "usual case" the persecutor will be 
the government. 272 However, this "usual case" is using the male model of 
asylum cases and is not necessarily reflective of asylum claims presented by 
women refugees. Gender-based asylum claims often involve persecution by 
non-governmental figures such as spouses,273 family members , 274 and guer-
rillas.275 If the persecutor is a non-governmental person or group, then the 
applicant must show that the government is unwilling or unable to protect 
her. The INS Guidelines instruct that "[i]t will be important in this regard, 
though not conclusive, to determine whether the applicant has actually 
sought help from government authorities.,,276 Furthermore, evidence that an 
attempt to seek such protection would be futile is also relevant to the Asy-
lum Officers' evaluation. 277 
The INS Guidelines assert that although the persecutor may be the gov-
ernment, the question still may arise as to whether the harm inflicted or 
threatened is "purely private. ,,278 By implication it appears the INS is con-
tending that if the harm is purely private then it will render the applicant 
ineligible for protection. The INS Guidelines cite to Lazo-Majano279 as an 
example of a claim in which the persecution was inflicted by a government 
agent, but was a "private act." As discussed previously, Ms. Lazo-Majano 
was "singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured, raped, and enslaved" by a 
sergeant in the Salvadoran Armed Forces who subjected her to his will by 
constantly threatening that he would reveal her to be a subversive.28O Even-
tually the sergeant carried out his threat, telling a friend of his in the police 
that she was a subversive.281 According to the INS Guidelines, "[b lased on 
evidence of severe treatment of subversives by Salvadoran authorities, the 
court determined that the applicant was a refugee on account of the political 
271. Id. (citing Matter of Villa Ita, Int. Dec. No. 3126 (BIA 1990». 
272. Id. at 16. 
273. See, e.g., Matter of A- and Z-, A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va. 
Dec. 20, 1994), reported in /J Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS 
Guidelines Imminent, supra note 25, at 521 (recognizing spousal abuse as persecution for 
asylum purposes); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), re-
ported in /J Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Muti-
lation, supra note 3, at 1188 (recognizing female genital mutilation and spousal abuse as 
grounds for asylum eligibility). 
274. See, e.g., Constable, supra note 5, at Dl (discussing gender-based asylum case in 
which female relatives kidnapped applicant and held her down while her clitoris was cut 
off during female genital mutilation ritual). See also More on /J Decision Granting Asy-
lum Based on Genital Mutilation, supra note 5, at 1265 (discussing the same case). 
275. See, e.g., Gomez, 947 F.2d 660; Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d 285. 
276. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17. 
277. Id. at 17. 
278. Id. at 16. 
279. 813 F.2d 1432. 
280. Id. at 1434. 
281. Id. at 1433. 
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opinion that could be imputed to her because of the public accusation, even 
without evidence that she actually held subversive views.,,282 
The INS Guidelines conclude that although the act might have been in-
terpreted as "purely private" which is not covered by the INA, the persecu-
tion was held to be on account of a protected characteristic because of the 
persecutor's conduct.283 This conclusion implies that the sergeant's public 
declaration of her alleged subversion transformed her claim from a private to 
a public claim. However, Ms. Lazo-Majano was granted asylum because 
she met all the requirements of the refugee defmition: she had suffered se-
vere abuse which constituted persecution; her persecution was inflicted by 
an agent of the government; and the persecution was on account of the po-
litical opinion imputed to her by the sergeant. This is the crux of the claim, 
that the persecution was on account of a protected ground. By implying that 
Ms. Lazo-Majano's asylum claim was not viable until the sergeant's public 
statement, the INS misinterprets the liberal holding of the case. 
The INS Guidelines appropriately compare Lazo-Majano to Matter of 
Pierre284 to clarify the distinction between public and private acts. In Mat-
ter of Pierre, the applicant was abused by her husband and could not receive 
protection from the government because her husband was a government of-
ficia1. 285 The applicant's claim was denied because she did not have a claim 
of persecution on account of one of the five enumerated grounds.286 The fact 
that her husband was a legislator did not by itself establish a claim of perse-
cution on account of political opinion even though the Haitian government 
would not restrain him. 287 Similarly in Klawitter v. INS,288 the applicant's 
failure to predicate a claim on one of the five enumerated grounds resulted in 
a denial of asylum. Again, harm (sexual harassment) inflicted by a govern-
ment official does not by itself constitute persecution on account of political 
opinion. The INS Guidelines do note that sexual harassment could be seri-
ous enough to rise to the requisite level of persecution and an asylum claim 
could be based on sexual abuse by a government official if the harm is in-
flicted on account of a protected ground. 289 These cases starkly illuminate 
the difficulty women refugees face in presenting gender-based asylum 
claims. Not all persecution that women suffer falls into one of the protected 
categories, resulting in a denial of gender-based claims because of the rigid-
282. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16. 
283. Id. 
284. 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975). 
285. Id. at 462. 
286. Id. at 462-63. Ms. Pierre sought withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h) 
which provides that the Attorney General shall not deport or return an alien whose life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of one of the five enumerated grounds. Proposed 
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 814 n.8. 
287. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17. 
288. 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992). 
289. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17 n.15. 
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ity of the extant structure which favors male applicants over female. 
The INS Guidelines further instruct the Asylum Officers that although 
acts of persecution may appear to be private, they "must determine whether 
a reasonable basis exists for regarding the act as a 'public' one that can be 
attributed to the government or an agent the government is unable or unwill-
ing to control. ,,290 The adjudicators must also ascertain whether the asserted 
persecution is on account of a protected ground. However, as noted above, 
although the persecution may be private, if it is on account of a protected 
characteristic and is inflicted by the government or someone the government 
is unwilling or unable to control, then the applicant has met her burden of 
demonstrating eligibility for asylum under the INA's refugee defmition. The 
adjudicator should also thoroughly explore the motive of the persecutor, the 
level of the harm inflicted or threatened, the identity of the persecutor, and 
the role of the government in offering protection.291 
The INS Guidelines state that international protection is appropriately 
provided when an asylum seeker can show that national protection is not 
available.292 Thus, after demonstrating that the persecutor is the government 
or someone the State is unwilling or unable to control, an applicant must 
further establish that the persecution exists nationwide. 293 If the applicant 
fails to demonstrate the existence of both of these factors, her asylum claim 
will most likely be denied. Two potential remedies, relocation in the appli-
cant's country of origin and government protection in other parts of the 
country, may preclude her from proving the nationwide persecution require-
ment.294 The INS Guidelines assert that if there is evidence that either of 
these two remedies is available, then the applicant will not qualify for asy-
lum.295 
If the asylum seeker can avoid further or feared persecution by relocat-
ing to another part of the country, then she will not be eligible for asylum. 296 
Furthermore, the Guidelines instruct that if a government "would offer pro-
tection from otherwise private acts of harm elsewhere in the country than the 
locality where those acts take place, then normally the applicant will not 
290. Id. at 17. 
291. Id. at 17 n.l5. 
292. Id. at 18. 
293. Id. (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by 
Matter ofMogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987); Matter of Fuentes , 19 I. & N. Dec. 
658 (BIA 1988); Matter ofR-, Int. Dec. 3195 at 7-9 (BIA 1992); Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 
783 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1986). 
294. The INS Guidelines imply that this second requirement must be established only in 
claims which are based on "private" persecution, in contrast to persecution by the govern-
ment which would inherently exist nationwide. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18. 
295. Id. 
296. In Lazo-Majano, the court took notice of the small size of EI Salvador and the appli-
cant's testimony that her persecutor threatened to look for her all over EI Salvador if she 
ever left him, to conclude that the applicant would be "in serious jeopardy if forced to re-
turn to her native land." 813 F.2d at 1435. 
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qualify for asylum.,,297 According to the INS Guidelines, these two potential 
remedies become crucial in the Asylum Officer's evaluation especially when 
the asylum claim is based on "private actions" such as domestic violence 
from which the state does not offer protection?98 
Adjudicators are instructed to consider numerous factors in these 
evaluations.299 They must explore the extent to which the government pro-
vides redress for or protection against persecution and the degree to which 
the risk of harm exists nationwide.3°O The INS Guidelines cite to the 
UNHCR Handbook for guidance regarding the reasonableness of requiring 
relocation. 301 The UNHCR Handbook states "a person will not be excluded 
from refugee status merely because [she] could have sought refuge in an-
other part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it would not 
have been reasonable to expect [her] to do SO.,,302 When evaluating whether 
it is "reasonable under all the circumstances" to expect a victim of domestic 
violence or other "private" acts to relocate, adjudicators must look to the 
facts of the particular case. 303 Asylum Officers should carefully explore the 
availability of government protection in other parts of the country, as well as 
the circumstances which provoked the persecution or the fear of persecu-
tion.304 In addition to determining whether protection was obtainable as a 
factual matter, the adjudicator must also consider whether the law of the 
applicant's country afforded protection. With these considerations in 
mind,305 the Asylum Officer can make a determination as to whether under 
all the circumstances, "it would be reasonable to expect a woman to seek 
residency elsewhere in her country .,,306 
297. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18 (citing Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 




302. Id. (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK 21-22, i 91). The Proposed Guidelines assert that 
"an asylum applicant does not have to establish that the persecution she fears exists na-
tionwide if, under all the circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for her to seek 
refuge in another part of the country." Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 (citing 
UNHCR HANDBOOK 21-22, i 91 and Matter ofR-, Int. Dec. No. 3195, slip op. at 8 (BIA 
1992». 
303. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18. 
304. Id. The Proposed Guidelines instruct the adjudicator to consider "the ability of the 
persecutor to act nationwide, whether the woman could genuinely access protection in an-
other part of her country, and whether the protection would have been meaningful." See 
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 & nn.29, 30. 
305. "Relevant factors to consider are financial, logistical and other barriers that may 
prevent the woman from reaching internal safety and whether the quality of internal pro-
tection meets basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights." Proposed 
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 (citing JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 
134 (1991 ). 
306. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18. The INS Guidelines conclude by emphasizing 
that a determination such as the reasonableness of relocation "underscores the general 
.. ~ 
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VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING GENDER-BASED 
ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 
Subsequent to the issuance of the INS Guidelines, significant decisions 
in gender-based asylum cases have altered the face of gender-based asylum 
jurisprudence. Whether the INS Guidelines themselves produced these re-
cent developments is not clear. However, apart from one aberrational deci-
sion in the Ninth Circuit, permissive decisions recently issued by the BIA 
and some Immigration Judges indicate that the INS Guidelines have made a 
positive impact on their intended recipients. The BIA, Us and federal courts 
have fmally started to create a uniform body of gender-based asylum case 
law which women refugees can utilize in presenting their asylum claims.307 
A. THE EN BANe DECISION IN FISHER V. INS308 
The en bane panel's decision in Fisher represents the one regressive de-
velopment in gender-based asylum jurisprudence following the issuance of 
the INS Guidelines. Fisher v. INS was first appealed to the Ninth Circuit by 
Ms. Fisher in 1993.309 The Ninth Circuit's fIrst decision in the case was is-
sued by a three-judge panel. That panel granted Ms. Fisher's petition for 
review of the BIA's decision, vacated that decision, and remanded for fur-
ther consideration. The three-judge panel's decision is the Fisher decision 
discussed in the INS Guidelines. On October 2, 1995, almost a year after 
the three-judge panel's decision was issued, the INS' request for a rehearing 
en bane was granted. A majority of the en bane panel reversed the three-
judge panel, withdrew the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision to remand to the 
need to develop the record fully with respect to both the applicant's particular circum-
stances and the conditions prevailing in the country of origin." Id. Acknowledging that 
adjudicators "must be able to rely on objective and current information on the legal and 
cultural situation of women in their countries of origin, on the incidence of violence, in-
cluding both sexual and domestic, and on the adequacy of state protection afforded to 
them," the INS Guidelines state that the INS Resource Information Center (RIC) will 
"attempt to assure that information concerning violations of the rights of women are dis-
tributed regularly and systematically to all Asylum Offices." See id. at 8. 
307. In contrast to the progressive decisions of adjudicators at all levels, Congress has 
taken a much more regressive approach to immigration. In 1996, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the megal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Both pieces of legislation revised the 
asylum application process, making it much more difficult to receive an award of asylum. 
A complete discussion of the statutory changes effected by AEDPA and IIRAIRA is beyond 
the scope of this comment. For a discussion of the impact of these two laws on the asylum 
procedure, see generally FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-1-5-20. 
308. 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996). 
309. The case was argued and submitted on April 13, 1996. See Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 
1366, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994). Ms. Fisher is an Iranian woman who sought asylum based on 
her opposition to the Iranian dress and moral conduct code. In her asylum application and 
appeals, Ms. Fisher claimed she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of 
her religious and political beliefs-opposition to the Iranian theocratic government and its 
fundamentalist Moslem doctrines. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the case, 
see 79 F.3d at 958-60; 61 F.3d at 1368-70. 
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BIA, and denied Ms. Fisher's asylum claim. 
The majority found that Ms. Fisher had not suffered persecution and did 
not have a well-founded fear of future persecution.310 Rather, the majority 
stated that the applicant "merely has established that she faces a possibility 
of prosecution for an act deemed criminal in Iranian society, which is made 
applicable to all women in that country,,,311 and prosecution for general 
crimes does not amount to persecution unless the punishment is dispropor-
tionately severe or the prosecution is pretextual. 312 According to the major-
ity, Ms. Fisher failed to establish that either of these two exceptions were 
applicable.313 In addition to failing to demonstrate that she had suffered per-
secution or faced future persecution, the majority further held that Ms. 
Fisher did not satisfy the nexus requirement.314 The majority concluded that 
Ms. Fisher's claim should be denied because she received only routine pun-
ishment for violating generally applicable laws, and she failed to show that 
she had suffered persecution or had a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of her political or religious beliefs.315 
Despite the fact that a majority of the panel overruled the earlier deci-
sion, the number of judges on the panel who expressed dissatisfaction with 
the majority's decision indicates that the precedential value of the en bane 
decision may be questionable. Judge Canby, joined by Judge Thompson, 
filed a concurring opinion "to emphasize a crucial aspect of this case.,,316 
Judge Canby clarified that Ms. Fisher's asylum claim was not premised on 
gender-based persecution. Rather, she sought asylum from persecution on 
account of her religious and political beliefs. Thus, as Judge Canby stated: 
There is no issue of gender discrimination before our en bane court. 
The majority opinion should not be read as establishing that en-
forcement of criminal laws against women, or the infliction of suf-
fering upon women, because they are women cannot constitute per-
secution under the Act. All that properly can be said is that the 
enforcement of criminal laws against Fisher because she is a woman 
does not, on this record, constitute persecution on grounds of relig-
ion or political belief-the only two grounds urged by Fisher.317 
Judge Canby further explained that he did not join the majority opinion 
because it might be misinterpreted too easily as deciding an issue that was 
310. 79 F.3d at 960-62. 
311. [d. at 962 (citations omitted). 
312. [d. at 961-62. 
313. [d. at 962. 
314. [d. at 963 ("Because Fisher has demonstrated only discrimination on account of her 
sex, not persecution on account of her religious or political beliefs, she has failed to carry 
her burden .... "). 
315. [d. at 964. 
316. [d. at 965 (Canby, J., concurring). 
317. [d. at 965-66 (Canby, J., concurring). 
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not raised by Ms. Fisher-whether persecution of women because they are 
women represents a ground for asylum under the INA.3I8 Judge Canby 
pointed to statements in the majority opinion which may be construed as 
"foreclosing the possibility that persecution of women on account of their 
gender presents a ground of asylum under the ACt.,,3I9 He concluded that 
although the majority's "gratuitous statements" only constitute dicta, he felt 
the court should not express a view on the subject until it has been briefed 
and argued in a case that turns on the point. 320 
In addition to the reservations expressed by the concurring judges, Judge 
Noonan, joined by Judge Fletcher, filed a scathing dissent.321 He stated that 
the principal division on the en bane panel was caused by the issue of 
whether the panel should remand requiring reconsideration or whether a mo-
tion to reopen by Ms. Fisher should be left to the discretion of the INS and 
the BIA.322 The dissent would have affrrmed the three-judge panel's deci-
sion, agreeing that the case should be remanded to the BIA for further con-
sideration.323 Judge Noonan stated that his decision was based on "the sea-
change in governmental policy" regarding gender-based asylum claims, spe-
cifically, the issuance of the INS Guidelines. 324 
He noted that the INS Guidelines provide particular guidance on the is-
sues presented in the case before the en bane panel: "The guidelines are 
an invitation to develop asylum law with special attention to the problems 
of women oppressed on account of their nonconformity with the moral 
codes of a rigorous regime.,,325 In fact, the INS Guidelines cite the three-
judge panel's opinion "[w]ithout the slightest criticism of the analysis and 
conclusions reached by the panel.,,326 Ultimately, Judge Noonan empha-
sized that the majority's dicta regarding gender persecution reflect only the 
opinions of those judges making up the majority: "Its dicta do not consti-
tute Ninth Circuit law.,,327 
Some commentators have similarly noted that the majority opinion in 
Fisher is not likely to be followed. The authors of one article noted that the 
internal inconsistencies in the majority opinion led the dissenters to suggest 
318. Id. at 966 (Canby, J., concurring). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. At one point in his dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan stated: "We are not very far 
from The Handmaid's tale when seven judges of this court are capable of expressing such a 
view." Fisher, 79 F.3d at 969 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
322. Id. at 967 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
323. Id. The majority left open the possibility that Ms. Fisher could move to reopen the 
proceedings before the BIA pursuant to 8 c.P.R. §§ 3.2, 208.19. Id.; seealsoPisher, 79 P.3d 
at 963. 
324. Fisher, 79 F.2d at 967 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
325. Id. at 968 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 969 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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future judicial nullification.328 Another author criticized the Fisher majority 
for reviewing the case "without regard to the then-recently promulgated INS 
gender guidelines and without so much as a mention of a the important de-
velopments in the law regarding gender-based asylum claims.,,329 Ulti-
mately, the majority opinion in Fisher must be viewed in context. It was 
decided without any consideration given to the INS Guidelines and before 
subsequent gender-based asylum decisions issued by the BIA. Furthermore, 
the Fisher opinion reaffrrmed the principle that federal courts must afford 
deference to BIA determinations.33o Thus, because Fisher is inconsistent 
with subsequent BIA decisions, its authoritative weight is likely to be mini-
mal.331 
B. IN RE KASINGA332 
In re Kasinga represents one of the most highly publicized asylum 
claims granted by the BIA.333 It is also the second gender-based asylum 
precedent issued by the BIA and the fIrst BIA decision granting asylum to a 
woman fleeing female genital mutilation (FGM). After being forced into a 
polygamous marriage and facing the imminent threat of being forced to un-
dergo FGM, Ms. Kasinga fled Togo, her native country, with the assistance 
of her mother and sister.334 She took the fIrst flight out of the country ending 
up in Germany where she spent the next two months. 335 In December 1994, 
Ms. Kasinga arrived in the U.S. and immediately applied for asylum when 
she entered the country. She spent the next 16 months in INS detention until 
she was released in April 1996.336 An Immigration Judge (D) in Philadel-
phia denied Ms. Kasinga's request for asylum, fmding that she was not 
credible and that she would not qualify for asylum even if she was credi-
ble.337 Ms. Kasinga subsequently appealed the D's decision to the BIA and 
retained new counsel. 338 The main issues addressed on appeal were credi-
bility and substantive eligibility for asylum.339 
328. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1179. 
329. Goldberg, supra note 185, at 894. 
330. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1179. 
331. Id. ("Fisher is therefore arguably not a relevant opinion"); but see Sharif v. INS, 87 
F.3d 932, 936 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (''The Ninth Circuit has concluded that persecution on 
account of gender is not included as a category allowing relief .... "). 
332. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15 (BIA June 13, 1996). For an 
extensive discussion and analysis of the case by the attorney who represented Ms. Kasinga 
on her appeal before the BIA, see Musalo, supra note 84, at 853. 
333. See Goldberg, supra note 185, at 895. 
334. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *4-5; see also Musalo, supra note 
84, at 854. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. Musalo, supra note 84, at 855. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
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The BIA reversed the U's decision and granted Ms. Kasinga's asylum 
application. In contrast to the U, the BIA found the applicant to be credible 
on the basis of her testimony in support of her application and the substan-
tial background information she provided.34O The Board specifically rejected 
the U's credibility determination, rmding the applicant reasonably and ade-
quately explained the issues raised by the U. 341 The BIA also held that Ms. 
Kasinga faced persecution on account of membership in a particular social 
group. Her particular social group was comprised of "young women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that 
tribe, and who oppose the practice. ,,342 
To support their social group formulation, the Board cited to Matter of 
Acosta/43 Matter of H_,344 and the Third Circuit's decision in Fatin v. 
INS. 345 The BIA stated that a particular social group is "dermed by common 
characteristics that members of the group either cannot change or should not 
be required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their 
individual identities.,,346 The Board continued: "The characteristics of being 
a 'young woman' and a 'member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe' cannot 
be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so 
fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should not 
be required to change it.,,347 
Although Kasinga represents an important step forward in the develop-
ment of "membership in a particular social group" asylum law, the Board 
opted to take a more conservative approach by formulating a very specific 
and circumspect social group of which Ms. Kasinga was a member. Their 
formulation reflects the BIA's and the federal courts' reluctance to construct 
broad social groups which could accommodate "too many" asylum appli-
cants. Although creating narrowly drawn social groups to prevent the 
hordes of women refugees fleeing gender-based persecution may allay the 
fears of anti-immigration proponents, the reality is that whether the social 
group is dermed narrowly or broadly, that flood of women is not likely to 
inundate America's ports of entry.348 Thus, by formulating such a specifi-
340. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *17-19. 
341. [d. 
342. [d. 
343. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter oJMogharrabi, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 438 (BIA 1987). 
344. Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996). 
345. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Iranian women who 
refuse to conform to the Iranian Government's gender-specific laws and social norms may 
well satisfy the Acosta definition). This parenthetical was provided by the BIA. See Kas-
inga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *21. 
346. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *21-22. 
347. [d. at *22. 
348. "It is often expensive, difficult, and traumatic to uproot oneself and flee the country 
of one's birth. Women more than men are unlikely to have the resources, freedom, and the 
means to make such a journey." Goldberg, supra note 185, at 896. Ms. Goldberg also 
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cally defmed social group in Kasinga, the Board limited to some extent the 
favorable impact of its decision on the progression of gender-based asylum 
jurisprudence.349 
The issue of persecution constituted the most contentious issue before 
the BIA. The INS proposed a new framework for analyzing the persecution 
standard which would severely restrict the asylum eligibility of women who 
had suffered FGM in the past. The INS argued that for haqn or suffering to 
rise to the level of persecution required by the INA, it must be inflicted with 
malignant or punitive intent. 350 In FGM cases, the INS noted that this stan-
dard would rarely be met because presumably practitioners of FGM "believe 
that they are simply performing an important cultural rite that bonds the in-
dividual to society.,,351 
To remedy this outcome, the INS suggested that the malignant or puni-
tive intent requirement be waived when the type of harm "is so extreme as to 
shock the conscience of the society from which asylum is sought.,,352 To 
satisfy the INS' "shock the conscience test," an applicant must demonstrate 
that the harm is extreme, the harm is inflicted on an unconsenting or resist-
ing individual, and the individual must be seized and subjected to the ex-
treme harm, not merely suffer the consequences of refusal.353 To add insult 
to injury, the INS further explained that "FGM victims who were mutilated 
as children are presumed to have consented to it," and thus have not experi-
enced persecution which could constitute the basis for a claim of past perse-
cution.354 
Clearly, the INS' new framework was a poorly veiled attempt to limit 
the eligibility for asylum of women who had suffered FGM in the past. 
Ironically, the INS' approach directly contradicts the policies, spirit, and.di-
rectives found in the INS Guidelines. 355 Rather than seeking to harmonize 
existing case law, the INS attempted to create an exclusionary framework 
provides enlightening statistics from Canada which promulgated gender-based guidelines 
two years before the INS. During the two years after the issuance of the Canadian Guide-
lines, 40,000 refugee claims were filed in Canada; only 1,130 of those claims were gender-
related. Out of the 1,130 gender-related claims filed, 483 were granted, 273 denied, 284 
were still pending, and 126 had been withdrawn, terminated or abandoned. Id. at 896-97. 
349. But see Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *43-49 (Rosenberg, con-
curring) (criticizing majority's narrow social group formulation and discussing significance 
of broader social group formulations). 
350. Musalo, supra note 84, at 856. 




355. See, e.g., INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4 ("For example, rape ... , sexual abuse 
and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation are forms of mistreatment primar-
ily directed at girls and women and they may serve as evidence of past persecution on ac-
count of one or more of the five grounds.") (emphasis added). See also Kasinga, Int. Dec. 
3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *50 (Rosenberg, concurring) (noting INS' failure to make 
reference to its own gender-based guidelines). 
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which would be much more restrictive in practice than the legal approaches 
it promulgated in its own guidelines. Despite the INS' efforts to create a 
restrictive gender-based asylum precedent, the BIA rejected the INS' pro-
posed framework, fmding that PGM constitutes persecution within the 
meaning of the INA.356 Although the INS seems to be attempting to impede 
the progressive development of gender-based asylum case law, fortunately, 
adjudicators have not been hindered by these obstructions. 
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
In addition to the important precedent set by Kasinga, there are a 
growing number of decisions by Immigration Judges which have further 
developed gender-based asylum jurisprudence. In Matter of A- and Z-,357 
a Jordanian woman was granted asylum based on the severe, sustained 
domestic abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband for many years.358 
Despite the INS' argument that the harm she faced was the product of a 
personal marital dispute, the IT held that she was eligible for asylum on ac-
count of her membership in a particular social group and her political 
opinion.359 The IT found that she was a member of a particular group of 
women who challenge the traditions of Jordanian society and government 
and that this opposition also constitutes her political opinion.360 
In Matter of M-K-, 36 I a woman from Sierra Leone was granted asy-
lum on account of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future perse-
cution. The applicant had been forcibly subjected to PGM and severe do-
mestic abuse which comprised her past persecution claims, and she feared 
future persecution on account of her political party activism.362 Signifi-
cantly, the IT held that domestic violence constituted persecution under the 
INA. 363 Moreover, the IT found that "based on the domestic abuse, the ap-
plicant could be granted asylum based on political opinion 'for her resis-
tance to mandated female subservience and complaints about physical 
spousal abuse, or membership in a particular social group that consists of 
women who have been punished with physical spousal abuse for attempting 
to assert their individual autonomy.,,,364 The IT also concluded that the ap-
plicant had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on past political 
356. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *19-20. 
357. Matter of A- and Z-, A72 190 893, A72 793 219 (U Arlington, Va. Dec. 20, 
1994). reported in Anker et al.. supra note 24. at 1180. 
358. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1180. 
359. [d. 
360. [d. 
361. MatterofM-K-, A72 374 558 (ll Arlington, Va. Aug. 9,1995), reported in Anker 
et al., supra note 24, at 1180. 
362. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1180. 
363. [d. 
364. [d. (quoting Matter ofM- K-, A72 374 558 (ll Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995) at 
13). 
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activism, and that when measuring the past infliction of FGM in light of 
human rights nonns, it rises to the level of persecution. 365 
In Matter of D-M-, 366 an U granted asylum to a woman from Liberia 
who had suffered at the hands of guerrilla forces. The applicant was taken 
captive by Liberian guerrilla forces and was held for more than six 
months.367 During her captivity, she was repeatedly raped by a number of 
soldiers and by a high-ranking officer who designated her as his "wife. ,,368 
Based on the Second Circuit's decision in Gomez v. INS,369 the U found that 
the applicant was "persecuted not merely because of her gender, but because 
of the personal and inviolate component of her gender, which was her sexual 
identity.,,37o The Immigration Judge determined that she was eligible for 
asylum based upon her membership in a particular social group of women 
who share the immutable characteristic of having had their sexual identity 
attacked and violated and who share a common interest in keeping their sex-
ual identity inviolate and free from wanton terror.371 
The cases discussed above represent just three among a wide variety of 
cases heard by Immigration Judges who have reached varying conclusions. 
There are currently a number of gender-based asylum claims pending before 
Immigration Judges throughout the country.372 Inevitably, for every grant of 
a gender-related asylum claim, there is likely to be a denial. However, these 
recent trend-setting decisions represent a grass-roots movement of sorts; a 
movement which is inclined to interpret asylum law in a much more permis-
sive manner, a manner which creates more grants than denials of asylum. 
As the number of these decisions increase, the body of gender-based asylum 
jurisprudence likewise expands. If domestic violence becomes a more com-
mon basis for asylum and social group fonnulations become less circum-
spect and more inclusive, this growth can only bode well for women refugees 
seeking asylum in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
When the INS Guidelines were issued in May 1995, asylum advocates 
anticipated a subsequent evolution of the law of gender-based asylum. Un-
fortunately, that metamorphosis has yet to materialize. The INS Guidelines 
365. Anker et aI., supra note 24, at 1180. 
366. A40 379 801 (ll New York, N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993) reported in Anker et aI., supra 
note 24, at 1181. 
367. Anker et aI., supra note 24, at 1181. 
368. Id. 
369. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). 
370. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1181 (quoting Matter of D-M-, A40 379 801 (ll 
New York, N.Y. Nov. 22,1993). 
371. Id. 
372. For a brief description of a sampling of these cases, see Anker et aI., supra note 24, 
at 1181-82. 
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undoubtedly represent a very positive development in the area of asylum 
based on gender persecution. However, by emphasizing the current limita-
tions in the case law, the Guidelines adopted a circumspect rather than an 
expansive approach to gender-based asylum claims. The inherent deficien-
cies which pervade the INS Guidelines and their mere advisory nature serve 
to significantly limit their impact on gender-based asylum adjudications. 
The combination of these factors compels this author to conclude that the 
case law, which constitutes the legal basis of the INS Guidelines, must de-
velop to create a legal environment which facilitates uniform adjudications 
of gender-based asylum claims. 
Under a body of law that is relatively uniform, the divergent holdings in 
the stories of the women mentioned at the beginning of this Comment can 
become more consistent. That body of gender-based asylum law is currently 
in its developmental stage, but it is steadily progressing. Recent decisions 
issued by Immigration Judges, the BIA, and federal courts have recognized 
the unique forms of abuse that women suffer and have found them to be per-
secution for asylum purposes. They exemplify a recent trend in immigration 
law in which the INS, administrative tribunals, and federal courts have be-
come more willing to grant asylum claims predicated on gender-based perse-
cution. If this trend continues, the submission of gender-based asylum 
claims will be far less precarious in the future. Until then, women refugees 
will continue to live in fear of being returned to a life of persecution. 
